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The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
expands the relief available to "innocent spouses, " who would otherwise be held
jointly and severally liable for the taxes owed under a joint return. Joint and
several liability has posed serious problems for innocent women whose
husbands owe taxes butfile bankruptcy or simply run from the IRS, leaving these
women behind to face the consequences on their own. Because these women
have likely been left behind to care for their families, they have been easy targets
for the IRS in its quest to recover unpaid taxes. Many women have faced years of
harassment from the IRS for the taxes that are owed, and many have been left
destitute because the IRS has seized their life's savings.
In enacting the 1998 reforms, Congress sought to expand the relief
available to innocent spouses, but because the reforms retain joint and several
liability they will be ineffective at eliminating the Tax Code's bias against
women. The reforms are in fact harmful to women, as relief requires that a
woman establish that she is a victim. This is significant, because the tax laws
affect how society perceives married women, how these women perceive
themselves, and may further impact the choices these women make as to the role
they will play in society. Another troubling aspect of the new innocent spouse
provisions is that they are being administered by the IRS, the very agency that
targeted innocent spouses in the first place. Despite Congress'good intentions,
the 1998 Act falls short of effecting the changes necessary to establish equality
for women under the US. tax laws, which will only be accomplished when joint
and several liability is repealed in favor ofa proportionate liability standard.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (1998
Act)lcalls for additional taxpayer rights and more effective oversight of the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS).2 The Act parallels a voluntary joint effort
between the IRS and the Treasury Department to develop and implement
* I would like to thank my parents, Joan and Fred Lund, and my husband Ken, for their
love, support, and encouragement.
I Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat 685 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
2 See Internal Revenue Service: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 105th
Cong. (1998) (statement of Charles A. Rossotti, Commissioner of Internal Revenue), available
in 1998 WL 28310 [hereinafter Internal Revenue Service].
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reforms3 that will enable the IRS to better serve its customers-taxpayers. 4 In his
statement before the Senate Finance Committee in January 1998, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Charles 0. Rossotti, pronounced his "clear
and inescapable conclusion [that] the IRS must shift its focus away from its own
internal operations and think about its job from the taxpayers' point of view."'5
Rossotti supported the key provisions of the Act drafted in 1997 by the House of
Representatives 6 and welcomed the possibility that it "can be the impetus for
3 The reforms initiated by the IRS and the Treasury Department include the expansion of
innocent spouse relief. While the Treasury Department had announced these initiatives even
prior to the enactment of the Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998
[hereinafter 1998 Act], the changes were prompted by the congressional directive, contained in
the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 401, 110 Stat. 1452, 1459 (1996), that
the Treasury study the problems facing innocent spouses. See [1998 Transfer Binder] Stand.
Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 48,859 at 79,945. In addition, the Treasury issued its report one year
after the congressional deadline. See id. Apologizing for the delay, the Assistant Treasury
Secretary assured the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Oversight that the "tardiness"
was due to the Treasury Department's desire to thoroughly analyze the issues. See Joint
Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Donald C. Lubbick,
Assistant Treasury Secretary), available in 1998 WL 8992860, at *3 [hereinafter Lubbick,
Joint Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses]. Yet many practitioners were expecting
more sweeping changes than those that the Treasury finally announced. See Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep., supra. The reform measures include: processing all innocent spouse claims in one
location to ensure technical expertise and consistency in the application of the innocent spouse
rules; special training programs to familiarize IRS employees with the innocent spouse
provisions and the ways in which to assist taxpayers in preparing the necessary forms for
requesting relief; and reaching out at national and local levels to abused and battered spouses
who might qualify for relief under the innocent spouse provisions. See Lubbick, Joint Liability
and its Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra.
4 See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 2, at *2.
5 Id. at 1.
6 Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2676, 105th
Cong. (1997). Rossotti supported a number of taxpayer rights provisions, including one that
would give taxpayers the right to sue the government for up to $100,000 in civil damages
arising out of the negligence of an IRS employee who disregards any of the Internal Revenue
Code provisions or Treasury Regulations while engaged in the collection of federal income tax.
See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 2, at *5-*6. Rossotti stated, however, that the
applicable standard should be gross negligence. See id. at *6. The 1998 Act subsequently
amended I.R.C. § 7433, which provided for up to $100,000 in civil damages arising out of the
reckless or intentional disregard of any provision relating to the collection of federal income
tax, see I.R.C. § 7433 (1994 & Supp. II 1996), to provide for up to $100,000 in civil damages
arising from mere negligence, and up to $1,000,000 for intentional or reckless disregard of
such provisions. See Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3102, 112 Stat. 685, 730 (codified at I.R.C. §
7433(b) (West Supp. 1999)).
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bringing additional change to the IRS-change that will help to
accomplish... [this] shift in focus .... -"7 The Service thus pledged its
commitment to self-reform and to detecting and correcting abuses.8 Rossotti
assured that "it is a new day at the IRS."9
One of the measures endorsed by Rossottil ° and enacted under the 1998 Act
expands the relief available to "innocent spouses" from joint and several liability
stemming from a jointly-filed tax return. 1I Expanding innocent spouse protection
was one of the aims of legislative reform because of the harsh and often unfair
consequences to taxpayers who filed jointly and neither knew nor had a reason to
know that their spouses had reported an erroneous item to the IRS that resulted in
an understatement of tax.12 According to some estimates, there are between
seventy-five and eighty thousand cases every year in which the IRS is
"potentially pursuing the wrong spouse" for an assessment of taxes owed.13 Yet,
many of these taxpayers have been denied relief in the past because of the
inadequacies and inconsistencies of the old laws.14 The 1998 Act repeals the
7 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 2, at *6.
8 See id at *1.
9 Id at *12.
10 See id. at *6.
11 See Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015 (West
Supp. 1999)). The Tax Code otherwise imposes joint and several liability on married couples
filingjointly. See I.R.C. § 6013(dX3) (West Supp. 1999).
12 See IRS Reform: Innocent Spouse Rule, Congressional Research Serv., July 2, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 845794, at*1.
13 LR.S. Restructuring: Hearings Before the Senate Finance Committee, 105th Cong.
(Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Elizabeth Cockrell), available in 1998 WL 8991946.
14 See IRS Reform: Innocent Spouse Rule, supra note 12, at *2. While testifying on the
need to expand relief under the innocent spouse provision, Senator Bob Graham of Florida
stated:
Under the current tax law, if a husband and wife jointly sign a return, they are jointly
responsible for any deficiency that might subsequently be found to have been the result of
that filing.... Under the current law, there is a provision called "innocent spouse" in
which a spouse can theoretically avoid that responsibility. I emphasize the word
"feoretically," because the testimony we heard before the Finance Committee was that it
is virtually impossible for the standards of that innocent spouse provision to be met....
144 CONG. REC. S4473-74 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
Other Senators who have advocated expanded relief include: Senate Finance Chairman
William V. Roth, Jr. of Delaware; Charles Grassley of Iowa; Daniel Patrick Moynihan of New
York; and Alfonse D'Amato of New York, "who has characterized the current system as
'preposterous."' See Tom Herman, A Different Kind of Domestic Abuse: Senate Committee
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former "innocent spouse provision ' 15 and enacts a new provision 16 to take its
place.17 It also amends section 66 of the Internal Revenue Code, 18 which
provides limited relief for innocent spouses filing separate returns in community
property states.19
While few question the need to expand innocent spouse protection, many
critics are divided as to the appropriate form of relief.20 The debate is whether to
Works on a Proposal to Help Protect Innocent Divorced or Separated Spouses from the Tax
Collector, CM. TRIB., May 1, 1998, § 6 at 3.
On September 10, 1998, New York Governor George Patald signed a similar innocent
spouse bill into law, effective January 1, 1999. According to Albany's Times Union:
Pataki said he had concerns the law might create a bureaucratic tangle for married
couples who want to file joint returns and might be inconsistent with new federal laws. "I
approve of this bill because I share the sponsors' concerns for the plight of the innocent
spouse," Pataki wrote in his approval message. But he instructed the state tax department
to study federal law on the issue and to minimize the burden it might place on married
taxpayers.
Associated Press, Pataki Signs Tax Bill in Spite of Concerns, TIMES UNION, Sept. 11, 1998, at
B2.
Note that the problems inherent in the old laws were compounded by the lack of publicity
on innocent spouse relief and the fact that the IRS had no procedures in place for handling
requests for such relief. The Dow Jones News Service reported:
[IT]he IRS doesn't have a specific form or procedure for divorced taxpayers
to... claim "innocent spouse" status. Indeed, the program has such a low profile that one
IRS official told the [General Accounting Office] he wasn't aware it existed. Even the
GAO had trouble getting information about the program. But, based on the scant data it
received, the GAO said it appears "that [the] IRS received few requests for innocent
spouse relief and denied most of them."
Judith Bums, GAO Finds Fault with IRS Handling of Innocent Spouses, Dow JONES NEWS
SERV., Feb. 24, 1998, available in Westlaw (DJNSPLUS), at *2.
15 See § 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. at 740 (repealing I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994)).
16 See I.R.C. § 6015 (West Supp. 1999).
17 See § 3201(a), 112 Stat. at 734.
18 See § 3201(b), 112 Stat. at 739.
19 See I.R.C. § 66(c) (West Supp. 1999).
20 The IRS and the Treasury Department conducted a study on joint return and
community property issues facing divorced and separated taxpayers, and requested public
comment on a number of proposals to change the law. See Study of Certain Joint Return and
Community Property Issuesfor Divorced and Separated Taxpayers, I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-
1 C.B. 371. The proposals included replacing joint and several liability with a proportionate
liability standard; basing taxpayers' obligations and liabilities on the terms set forth in divorce
decrees, separation agreements, or other property settlements; reforming the innocent spouse
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liberalize the innocent spouse provision or repeal it and abandon joint and
several liability.21 One consideration is the feasibility of revising the innocent
spouse provision and the administrative costs that are associated with such
changes. 22 But the debate has focused primarily on the question of equity and, in
provisions; and limiting the tax-splitting rule currently in force in community property states.
See id Even Congress was divided as to the appropriate action to take. The House version of
the I.R.S. Reform Bill, see Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1997,
H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 321, revised the innocent spouse provision, making it easier to
qualify for relief, while the Senate version repealed the exemption and replaced it with a
provision allowing for a separate liability election. See IRS Reform: Innocent Spouse Rule,
supra note 12, at *2. The Clinton Administration opposes modification of joint and several
liability; instead it simply wants to improve the current program. See Bums, supra note 14, at
*2.
21 The American Bar Association Section of Taxation Domestic Relations Committee
wrote a direct response to the IRS's request for public comment on various proposals to change
the law on joint and several liability under ajoint return. See American Bar Association Section
of Taxation Domestic Relations Committee, Comments on Liability of Divorced Spouses for
Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed Joint Returns, 50 TAX LAw. 395, 395 (1997). In its
report, the Committee reprinted the following resolutions, adopted in February 1995 by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association in its Legislative Recommendation:
RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to Congress that sections
6013(d) and (e) of the Internal Revenue Code ... be repealed (i) to eliminate joint and
several liability of a taxpayer who has signed a joint return with his or her spouse for tax
on income properly attributable to his or her spouse, (ii) to substitute separate liability for
tax shown to be due on the joint return, and (iii) to repeal innocent spouse relief from
liability for tax on the joint return when the liability arises from erroneous items of the
taxpayer's spouse;
FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recommends to Congress
that section 66 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 be amended (i) to overrule the
holding of Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), so that married taxpayers who live in
community property states will not be individually liable for income tax on any portion of
the income earned by their spouse; (ii) to refer to section 879(a), with modifications, for
the purpose of attributing income to a spouse in a community property state for income
tax purposes; and (iii) to repeal the provisions granting relief from tax on income
attributed to the taxpayer as the taxpayer's share of community income earned by the
taxpayer's spouse.
Id. While the American Bar Association's proposal would allocate the liability for a deficiency
between spouses as if each had filed a separate return, this allocation would not change a
couple's total liability and could not be used by either spouse to secure a refund of any portion
of the tax that he or she may have already paid on behalf of the other spouse. See id at 396.
22 Supporters of joint and several liability defend it on the basis of administrative
convenience and even necessity;, they argue that separate liability under a joint return would
place too great a burden on tax collectors by requiring them to sort through income,
deductions, and credits attributable to each of the spouses filing jointly. See IRS Reform:
Innocent Spouse Rule, supra note 12, at *2. But critics argue that tax collectors perform these
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particular, whether it is more equitable to abandon joint and several liability or to
continue imposing it under all but a few exceptional circumstances.2 3 The new
law retains joint and several liability but expands the protections afforded to
innocent spouses. While the changes are a vast improvement over the old law, a
critical issue-the effects of the innocent spouse provision on women-was
overlooked by Congress in its decision to retain joint and several liability and to
instead reform the innocent spouse provision.
The innocent spouse provision is "intended" to provide relief for all innocent
spouses, men and women alike.24 However, the innocent spouse who seeks relief
is almost invariably a woman,25 a fact that Congress was well aware of when it
enacted the new law.26 In fact, it was the testimony of four women that may have
same functions whenever they conduct an audit. See id. Some oppose changing the joint
liability laws because of the potential cost of doing so. See id. The Chicago Tribune reported
that "the Senate Finance Committee bill's fate is clouded by several factors. Among these is an
estimate by the Joint Tax Committee that the proposed changes would be costly to the
Treasury. Treasury officials... have been resisting major changes in the innocent-spouse
rules .... " Herman, supra note 14, at 3. In particular, Treasury officials fear that a move
towards separate liability will result in an increase in fraud and a reduction in tax revenues. See
Bums, supra note 14. These were the reasons cited by Assistant Treasury Secretary Donald
Lubbick, in his testimony before a House Ways and Means subcommittee, in favor of retaining
joint and several liability. See id.
23 Critics of joint and several liability argue that it places undue hardship on innocent
spouses, that the innocent spouse provisions are vague and too difficult to apply, and that the
courts have been too inconsistent in their interpretation and application of the law. See 1RS
Reform: Innocent Spouse Rule, supra note 12, at *2; see also Christopher B. Wyrick, Till
Death Do Us Part-Including Our Taxes: Inequity Abounds in Spousal Joint and Several Tax
Liability and the "Innocent Spouse" Rule, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 163, 179
(asserting that joint and several liability is unconscionable because "the inequities to Americans
thoroughly outweigh the benefits to the government of collecting slightly more revenue").
2 4 See 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201(a)(1), 112 Stat. 685, 735 (1998) (codified
at I.R.C. § 6015(a) (West Supp. 1999)). This new provision provides that "[any] individual
who has made a joint return may elect to seek relief .... " (emphasis added). Id at
§ 6015(a)(1).
2 5 Newsday reported in 1994 that wives brought approximately 95% of all innocent
spouse cases. See H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040: Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability and in Some
Cases, That Means Trouble, NEwSDAY, Jan. 30, 1994, at 76. Professor Richard Beck of The
New York University Law School testified that the IRS "attempts to collect from the wrong
spouse in at least 50,000 cases a year." Rob Wells, Senators Hear Innocent Spouses Complain
About IRS Hounding: U.S. Tax System Mistreats Divorced Women, Panel Told, SAN DIEGO
UNION & TRiB., Feb. 12, 1998, at A9.
26 Senator Bob Graham of Florida testified before apanel in 1998:
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compelled the legislature to examine the situation more closely and to enact
changes to the law which lessened its harmful effects 27 But the innocent spouse
provision, even as amended, is itself harmful to women. It affects not only how
society perceives married women, but also how women perceive themselves.
This harm has been overlooked by Congress and the IRS in their reform efforts.
This Comment is not the first to criticize provisions of the Tax Code as
harmful to women.2 8 Many scholars criticize the fact that the Tax Code provides
A typical case is that after a husband and wife have had marital discord and are
divorced, the husband may have left town and is difficult to find, the IRS locates the
custodial parent typically the wife, who is more easily accessible and then the [wife]
becomes responsible for 100 percent of the tax deficiency that was the result of a filing
while the marriage was in place.
144 CoNG. REc. S4473 (daily ed. May 7, 1998) (statement of Senator Bob Graham).
Even the hypotheticals in the innocent spouse provision indicate Congress' awareness of
the prevalence of "innocent" wives. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-599, at 252-53 (1998). In
each of the examples cited, the deficiency in tax owed is attributable to the husband, and it is
the wife who is the innocent spouse. See id
27 Karen J. Andreasen, Josephine Berman, Elizabeth Cockrell, and Svetlana Pejanovic
testified at a Senate Finance Committee hearing on February 11, 1998, to tell Senators about
their struggles with the IRS arising out of joint and several liability. See generally Herman,
supra note 14; Wells, supra note 25. Elizabeth Cockrell moved to the U.S. from Canada to
many her first husband and left the marriage less than three years later, with pots and pans and
only $2000. See Field Hearing on Innocent Spouse Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate,
105th Cong. (Mar. 9, 1998) (statement of Elizabeth Cockrell regarding GAO estimates)
(visited Jan. 3, 2000) <http'//www.fvp.net/wifetwax/testimony.htm>. She began battling the
IRS nine years after her divorce after learning that the IRS expected her to pay over half a
million dollars in back taxes attributable to investments that her husband made during their
brief marriage. See id. She subsequently founded an organization called W.I.F.E.-Women for
IRS Financial Equity-and testified before the Senate Finance Committee: 'I am lucky. I
fought my way back and was able to earn the resources to combat the IRS. I would like to be a
voice for those women who are not so fortunate." Id
According to The San Diego Union-Tribune:
Cockrell and three other women delivered dramatic testimony, contending they were
unjustly pursued by the IRS for tax debts of their former husbands. Josephine Berman of
South Orange, N.J., said she faces a $400,000 tax bill due to improper deductions made
by her former husband on their 1968, 1969 and 1970 tax returns. The IRS has seized her
$40,000 IRA account and has slapped a lien on her home. "I have existed under the black
cloud of an immense tax debt for the last 28 years," Berman said. "I was never involved in
any of my husband's business activities nor was I ever included in any business or tax
decisions."
Wells, supra note 25 at A9. Tom Herman noted that "Senators were deeply moved by [these]
stories ... ." Herman, supra note 14 at 3.
2 8 See, e.g., Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and
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a tax incentive for a married couple to file jointly while providing an additional
incentive, via aggregation and progressive taxation, for the wife to limit her
income, and imposes a higher tax differential on the wife who is a "secondary
earner,"'29 thus transferring wealth from the wife to her husband.30 This
Comment, however, examines an additional result that makes just as little sense:
The same woman, who as a secondary earner tends to have less control over the
family's finances, ordinarily faces joint and several liability for the taxes owed
on her and her husband's joint income, and relief is available under the innocent
spouse provision only if she declares herself a victim.
If a woman can establish that she is naive, uneducated, abused, abandoned,
that her marriage has failed, or that the assessment will cause her undue hardship
(i.e., that she is a victim), then she will prevail under the innocent spouse
provision.31 Thus, the innocent spouse is victimized: First, under the current tax-
assessment scheme and again under the new law which promises relief from
undue hardship only if she files what amounts to a petition for mercy. And, yet,
where the provision does offer relief, it may disproportionately benefit those
women who have access to better resources and who thus may find themselves
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241,243 (1997) (identifying
the Tax Code's disincentives for women to work); Edward J. McCaffery, Taxing Women: How
the Tax Code Discriminates Against Women and Families, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1997, at 37, 40
(proposing "five easy answers" to eliminating the Tax Code's bias against working wives).
Criticisms include the current structure of social security, nontaxation of imputed income,
inadequate child-care and work-related deductions, and mandatory acceptance of fringe
benefits in lieu of cash equivalents. See id. at 38-40.
29 
"Often, one spouse's labor force participation is considered more important to the
family's welfare such that, were the family put to a choice, that spouse's job would be retained
and the other spouse's job would be forfeited as secondary." Laura Ann Davis, Note, A
Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197,
198 (1988). Women are secondary earners far more often than men. Approximately 40% of
married mothers stay at home full time as compared to almost no fathers, and the average wife
who does work earns only 60% of her husband's salary. See McCaffery, supra note 28, at 38.
On average, white married women contribute 29% of their household's total income, while
black married women contribute approximately 40%. See Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage
Bonus/Penalty in Black and White, 65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787, 793 (1997) (arguing that black
couples are more likely to suffer "marriage penalties" and tend to pay more in such penalties
than do white couples). For a discussion of "marriage penalties," see infra Part II.C.
30 See Christian, supra note 28, at 279-348 (explaining how aggregation of income and
income splitting substantially harm women). See also generally infra Part lI.A-B.
31 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Charles 0. Rossotti, recognized: "The
taxpayers affected have been among the nation's most vulnerable and will benefit significantly
from the enhanced relief the restructuring legislation gave them." Interim Guidelines for
"Equitable Relief' for Innocent Spouses, I.R.S. News Release IR-98-73 (Dec. 7, 1998),
available in 1998 WL 857065.
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in less desperate circumstances; a woman who can afford a good divorce lawyer
is likely to be better informed of her rights and better able to negotiate the timing
of a divorce and the terms of a settlement, so as to adequately protect herself
under the innocent spouse provision.
While other writers have proclaimed the merits of abandoning the joint
return in favor of a separate filing system, 32 this Comment proposes that, at a
minimum, a small but important step be taken toward equity, equality, and
dignity under the current Tax Code: The abandonment of joint and several
liability.33 Part II examines some of the ways in which the Tax Code
discriminates against women, and discusses the reasons why joint and several
liability is inequitable. Part HI gives a brief sketch of the previous innocent
spouse provision and underscores its failure to provide adequate and consistent
relief to innocent spouses; Part E[[ also explains the new innocent spouse
provision, the scope of relief that it provides, and how, although equitable in
nature, it merely furthers the victimization of women. Part IV challenges the
IRS's claims of reform and examines how liberally the new innocent spouse
rules will likely be applied. Part V concludes that radical change is necessary,
and that the answer lies not in an expanded innocent spouse provision but rather
in the abandonment ofjoint and several liability.
I. THE U.S. TAX CODE: A HISTORY OF VICTMIZING WOMEN
The status of women under the U.S. tax law has always been suspect. When
taxes were first imposed by the federal govemment,34 women did not even
constitute "persons" under the law against whom assessments could be made.35
While women would gradually gain the "righf' to be taxed as persons, they
would be taxed only in ways that benefited their husbands. Today, married
women are still taxed under the same dubious methods that applied more than a
32 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 28, at 40; Davis, supra note 29, at 199.
33 Today, the United States is the only "major country" that imposes joint and several
liability on married couples filing jointly. In countries where married taxpayers are separately
rather than jointly liable, "every person owes income tax on whatever he or she earns, married
or not. 'That's the sensible rule, that's the rule in civilized countries' .... 'That's not the rule in
our country."' Cummins, supra note 25 (quoting Richard Beck of The New York Law
School).
34 Pursuant to its power under U.S. CONST. amend. XVI, enacted in 1913.
35 In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (1937), the Supreme Court held that "[t]he
tax being on persons, women may be excepted on the basis of special considerations to which
they are naturally entitled." See Alice Kessler-Harris, "A Principle of Law But Not of Justice":
Men, Women and Income Taxes in the United States 1913-1948, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN's STUD. 331,332 (1997).
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half-century ago.36 These methods are not only unfair-they are detrimental to
the interests of all women. They impact women's career choices, the value that
society places on women, and even their sense of self-worth.
In order to see how the Tax Code discriminates against women, it is
necessary to consider the history of taxation as it relates to married women. Four
phenomena will be briefly examined in this historical context: aggregation of
income, income splitting, marriage penalties and bonuses, and joint and several
liability.
A. Aggregation ofIncome
Under a progressive tax scheme such as the Internal Revenue Code,
taxpayers who earn more income are taxed at progressively higher rates and thus
pay a greater share of tax than those who earn less.37 The Treasury Department
instituted this tax scheme in the early part of the twentieth century, believing it to
be equitable because it is premised on the ability to pay.38 However, the Treasury
Department also recognized that, at that time, most husbands were the sole
breadwinners in their families,39 and it feared that under a progressive tax
scheme, a husband might attempt to reduce his taxes by attributing a portion of
his income to his non-earning wife, who would then pay tax on "her" share of the
couple's joint earnings at a lower progressive rate.40 In effect, the income
3 6 As one commentator noted:
If the federal government passed a law imposing steep fines on married women who
tried to work outside the home, the populace would probably be outraged, and
constitutional and statutory challenges would soon follow. But the deep biases of the tax
system, which have just that effect, linger unchallenged and unexamined. In fact, changes
that have been enacted have been more likely to make the burdens on working women
worse.
McCaffery, supra note 28, at 38.
37 See, e.g., I.R.C. § I (Supp. Ell 1997).
38 See Kessler-Harris, supra note 35, at 334. "All tax theorists... would probably agree
that the ability to pay is basic to any notion of fairness in the tax system." Davis, supra note 29,
at 222.
39 Aggregation of income was introduced in the 1920s. As late as the mid-1940s, 80 to
85% of all married couples had only one working spouse. See Davis, supra note 29, at 205.
40 In fact, throughout the 1920s, affluent married taxpayers attempted to pass income to
their spouses by signing contracts, forming trusts, and even creating partnerships with their
wives, in an effort to save on taxes. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 35, at 336. However, in
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930), the Supreme Court refused to recognize a
contract, at least for federal income tax purposes, under which a husband purportedly shifted
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splitting would allow the husband and wife to each pay tax on a portion of the
husband's earnings, and with each doing so within a lower income bracket than
would otherwise apply. The Treasury Department curtailed such efforts by
assessing taxes on a couple's aggregate income as if all of the income had been
earned by the husband, even if a portion had been earned by his wife.41
Taxing a married couple's income on an aggregate basis was premised on
the notion that married women did not constitute "persons" under the law.42 A
wife's identity was subsumed within her husband's. 43 Some women protested,
"wish[ing] to maintain symbolic as well as actual control of their own
incomes." 44 These women "had fought for property rights within marriage,
struggled for suffrage and believed vigorously in economic independence." 45
Men also contested aggregation, primarily because any income that was
attributable to their wives, whether because their wives earned the income or
were contractually entitled to it, meant that they might have to pay tax on the
couple's total income at a higher progressive rate.46
Aggregation of income became a key component of taxation at this time,
when few married women worked, and was, in essence, a form of social
engineering. By imposing progressively higher tax rates on a couple's aggregate
income, it penalized men who married women having any claim to income of
their own. Yet, the practice went unchallenged 47and, through aggregation, the
Tax Code continues to penalize dual-income families, even today. But while the
effects of income aggregation and progressive taxation are felt by couples
jointly, the brunt of the harm is suffered by women. Because progressive taxation
creates an incentive to limit a couple's aggregate earnings in order to avoid a
income to his wife.
41 See Kessler-Harris, supra note 35, at 335.
42 See id
43 See id. at 332.
44 Id at 334.
45 Id.
46 See id. at 335.
47 Davis explains:
Congress' decision to treat the married couple as a taxable unit is perhaps most
favorably justified as reflecting the perceived economic realities of the time-that
husbands and wives tended to pool their income and services and to share expenses. In
light of the fact that eighty to eighty-five percent of the married couples in the mid-1940's
contained only one wage earner..., Congress' acceptance of the pooling assumption to
justify its new system went largely unchallenged.
Davis, supra note 29, at 205 (citations omitted).
1999] 2055
OHIO STATE LA WJOURTAL
higher tax rate and because married women are more often than not the
"secondary earner," it is the wife who is more likely to cut back on the hours that
she works and perhaps even give up working all together.48
As a result, women may be marketing themselves less effectively than men.
In addition, there is the prevailing perception that a married woman with children
is more likely than a married man to place her family before her career, and
employers are, therefore, less willing to pay a working mother as well as they are
a married man.49 Aggregation of income in the context of a progressive taxation
scheme provides a disincentive for married women to develop financial
independence, and the career choices that women make as a result influence
employers' perceptions of women overall.50 Aggregation of income thus has a
discriminatory impact on women.
4 8 President Reagan signed the Tax Reform Act of 1986, effecting a "massive lowering of
progressive marginal rates," including a drop in the highest rate from 50%, down to 28%.
McCaffery, supra note 28, at 41. Believing that women were working because of inflation and
merely to pay taxes, Reagan expected that the drop in rates would result in more women
choosing to stay at home with their children. Id. But the lowering of progressive marginal rates
actually resulted in an increase of married women in the labor market, thus supporting the
argument that higher progressive rates deter women from working. Id. "At least in terms of the
goal of getting married women to go back home, the 1986 act backfired.' Id Under the current
tax-assessment scheme, however, dual-income families still forfeit, on average, two-thirds of
the working wife's salary to taxes and work-related expenses, see id. at 38, and this forfeiture
may influence a wife's decision to work. Davis explains the phenomenon this way:
When married couples file jointly, the income of the second earner, typically that of the
wife, is taxed at the primary earner's top marginal rate. Since her dollars are perceived as
more "expensive" to the family, she must generate enough income to compensate for her
absence from the home and her additional tax burden. The married woman is thus
deterred from entering the labor force and the mainstream of social and political life.
Davis, supra note 29, at 210 (citations omitted).
49 With the arrival of children, many women decide to stay home and many men decide
to work harder-influenced in part by a tax system designed to have that effect. Employers
then, perhaps unconsciously, form an opinion that female employees are less committed than
their male counterparts. In fact, virtually all of the lingering salary gap between men and
women stems from the effects of marriage. Single men and women are paid roughly the same
wage. Following marriage, women's salaries go down while men's go up. See McCaffery,
supra note 28, at 41, 77.
50
"From a feminist perspective, this disincentive reflects a societal policy of keeping
married women in the home, and thus constitutes a significant barrier to the full recognition of




At first, men as well as women challenged the government's treatment of
women under the tax laws.51 The challenges brought by men were not based on
any ethical concerns but rather were based on the mere fact that these men did
not want to pay taxes at the higher progressive rates that would be applicable to
their family's aggregate income.52 Many of these men had a legal basis for
challenging aggregation-the community property laws of the states in which
they lived.
In community property states, each spouse has legal title to half of all
community property income.53 Therefore, a wife owns half of her husband's
earnings. Men in community property states challenged the aggregation of
income, which treated a woman's income as if it were earned entirely by her
husband, on the basis that it was unconstitutional because it "threatened the
principle of states' rights, and specifically the rights of states to define the
ownership of property and the personhood of women." 54 In response to the
counterclaims made by the common-law states that taxes should be assessed
against all (male) taxpayers on an equal basis regardless of the laws of the states
in which they live, husbands in community property states argued that they
undertook greater burdens than did husbands in common-law states, because of
the separately-vested interests of their community property wives.55
The Supreme Court settled the matter in Poe v. Seaborn,56 holding that taxes
could not be assessed against the income of both husbands and wives on an
aggregate basis in community property states.57 But because taxpayers in
community property states could not be taxed on an equal basis with taxpayers in
common-law states58 and because common-law states began adopting
51 See Kessler-Harris, supra note 35, at 336-37.
52 See id.
53 Community property is any property acquired by a couple while married and domiciled
in a community property state. See Taxes and Marital Situations, I.R.S. News Release FS-97-
13 (Sept. 1997), available in 1997 WL 585426.
54 Kessler-Harris, supra note 35, at 341.
55 The "burden" imposed on husbands in community property states was the fact that
community property laws rendered them powerless over their wives' share of the marital
property. See id at 342-43.
56 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
57 Seeid. at 118.
58 The split in income between a husband and wife in a community property state had the
effect of "automatic tax-free income shifting between spouses," see Davis, supra note 29, at
201, which the government had sought to eradicate through the aggregation of income.
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community property laws in order to avoid aggregation, 59 the Treasury
Department introduced the concept of income splitting under an optional joint
filing system: Income earned by a taxpayer in a common-law state would be split
equally between him and his wife, but only for the purposes of determining the
rate applicable to their total aggregate income.60
Under the income splitting scheme, a couple who files jointly is taxed at the
same rate that would be applicable to a taxpayer who was married and filed
separately but who made half of the couple's total income.61 In effect, a jointly-
filing wife is deemed to have earned half of her income plus half of her
husband's, and her husband is deemed to have earned half of his income plus
half of hers.62 Each spouse is then assessed an equal amount of tax, computed by
multiplying the applicable rate by the portion of income attributed to each of
them. 63 Because of the potential tax savings,64 income splitting may provide an
incentive for a married couple to file jointly rather than separately. The couple
may benefit from income splitting if one of the spouses--typically the wife-
earns less than the other. The less one earns relative to the other, the more the
59 During World War II, when revenue demands were high, the maximum tax rate
climbed to 94%. In an effort to help ease the financial burden imposed on taxpayers, a number
of states adopted community property statutes in order to provide the tax advantages available
to couples under Poe v. Seaborn. See Davis, supra note 29, at 202.
60 See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, §§ 301-303, 62 Stat. 110, 114-16 (1948), repealed
by Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 7851, 68A Stat. 3, 919-22 (1954).
Income splitting is still an integral part of the Tax Code, see, e.g., infra note 61, but is
often criticized because it provides the same tax benefits that are available to married couples in
community property states without requiring the actual transfer of income or assets from one
spouse to the other. Thus, "common law property states have no incentive to adopt community
property laws, which are widely held to be more sympathetic to women's rights." Davis, supra
note 29, at 198.
61 For example, compare I.R.C. § l(a) (Supp. 111 1997), which gives the table of rates
applicable to married individuals filing joint returns, with I.R.C. § l(c) (Supp. 11 1997), which
gives the rates applicable to married individuals filing separate returns. A married couple filing
jointly will pay a 15% tax on up to $36,900 ofjoint income, while a married individual who
files separately will pay a 15% tax on up to half that amount, or $18,450. Therefore, the couple
who files jointly is paying at the rate applicable to half of their joint income and is therefore
enjoying the benefits of income splitting. Without income splitting, a married man who eams
$36,900 of taxable income and files jointly with a non-earning spouse would pay at the same
rate as a married individuai who eams $36,900 and files a separate return-$2768 plus 28% of
the excess over $18,450; in other words, an effective rate of 21.5% rather than the 15% rate
that would be applicable to married couples via income splitting. The difference in rates means
that income splitting will result in a tax savings of almost $2400.
62 See Christian, supra note 28, at 257.
63 See id.
64 See, e.g., supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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couple -will likely save in taxes by filing jointly.65
Unfortunately, if a wife earns less than her husband, then, even if the couple
realizes an overall tax savings by filing jointly, the very first dollar of her salary
may be taxed at a higher rate than if she filed separately.66 This is because her
deemed income-half of her income plus half of her husband's-will exceed her
actual income and thus, under the Tax Code's progressive tax scheme, may land
her in a higher income bracket. By contrast, her husband's deemed income-half
of his income plus half of his wife's-will be less than his actual income and
may land him in a lower income bracket. The net effect is a shifting of wealth
from her to her husband;67 the wife who is earning substantially less than her
husband is taxed at a higher rate than she otherwise would be if she filed
separately, while her husband is taxed at a substantially lower rate than he
otherwise would be if he filed separately. Thus income splitting, like aggregation
of income, is a form of social engineering that rewards those men who file
jointly and who have low income-earning wives,68 and penalizes many working
-women who marry.
69
In addition to the fact that wealth is shifted from the lower-income wife to
her higher-income husband, the lower-income wife may be at a disadvantage
when it comes to managing the family's finances. She is more likely to stay
uninvolved in her husband's business dealings and may thus be unaware of what
her husband is reporting, or not reporting, to the government on their joint return.
The implications are serious for the unsuspecting wife who is jointly and
severally liable for the taxes that the couple owes.7 °
C. Marriage Penalties and Bonuses
Depending on whether both spouses work and how much one makes relative
to the other, many married couples may be hit with what is called a "marriage
65 See Christian, supra note 28, at 257.
66 See Davis, supra note 29, at 210.
67 See Christian, supra note 28, at 242.
68 See id. at 275.
69 The fact that an ever-increasing number of women are working seems to suggest that
these penalties are small. But the increasing number of women in the work force may simply
reflect the fact that the desire of many women for economic independence and security
outweighs the penalties for working. In order to weigh the real effect of the penalties on
women, one must compare the number of women who currently work with the number of
women who would work if the aggregation-of-income scheme was repealed. See id. at 299.
70 Joint and several liability is imposed under ajoint return. See I.R.C. § 6013(a) (1994).
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penalty."71 Alternatively, couples may realize a tax savings-or a "marriage
bonus"--because of their marital status. Empirical evidence indicates that such
penalties and bonuses influence the choices people make about marriage. 72
Marriage penalties arise in many different ways. Some penalties inhere in
the tax rate tables.73 For example, a single male and a single female may each
fall within the 15% tax bracket based on their respective gross incomes.
However, if they were married to one another, they might find themselves in the
28% tax bracket based on their aggregate gross income, and thus incur a penalty
based on their marital status.74 Similarly, the aggregate amount of a couple's
total standard deductions is greater if they remain single, because the standard
deduction for married couples is less than twice the deduction for single
taxpayers.75
71 See generally Jonathan Barry Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties?,
30 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1996) (proposing several solutions for eliminating marriage penalties). For
two weeks during the summer of 1999, a radio ad campaign was broadcast in 17 congressional
districts, urging listeners to "call their representative and 'tell them to stop the marriage tax."'
See Jennifer Loven, End of "Marriage Tax" Sought, Assoc. Press, June 24, 1999, available in
1999 WL 17816870, at *1. The marriage penalty amounts to an average of $1400 for 21
million married couples, and eliminating it could cost the government $340 billion in lost tax
revenues over a five-year period. See id.
72 See Brown, supra note 29, at 788.
73 See Forman, supra note 71, at 5-7.
74 For example, see I.R.C. § 1(a), (c) (Supp. M 1997). Suppose two single taxpayers each
had $20,000 of adjusted gross income in 1997. Under § 1(c), each taxpayer would fall within
the 15% tax bracket and would pay $3000 in taxes, for a total tax of $6000. However, if they
were married to one another, their total taxable income would have been $40,000, they would
have fallen within the 28% tax bracket under § 1(a), and they would have paid taxes of $5535
plus 28% of the income in excess of $36,900, for a total tax bill of $6403. Because they would
have paid a total tax of only $6000 had they remained single, the married couple would have
incurred a marriage penalty of $403 under the 1997 rate tables.
75 See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (1994). For example, two single taxpayers would each take a
basic standard deduction of $3000, for a total deduction of $6000. However, if they were
married, whether they filed jointly or separately, they would take a total deduction of only
$5000-$1000 less-and thus, under the 1997 provisions, would incur a marriage penalty to
the extent of the taxes owed on the additional $1000 of gross income. In order to decrease the
marriage penalty, last year the House passed an increase in the standard deduction for married
couples filing jointly. See Loven, supra note 71, at *2. This increase in the standard deduction,
if enacted, would decrease the average marriage penalty by about $240, at a total cost of $4
billion a year in lost tax revenues. See id
Yet another example of a marriage penalty is the phaseout amount on personal
exemptions; the amount that a married couple can take phases out at an aggregate gross income
of less than twice the phaseout amount for single taxpayers. For example, under IR.C.
§ 151(d)(3), personal exemptions for single taxpayers begin to phase out when the taxpayer's
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These "penalties" are not intended as such but are premised on an increased
ability to pay and the fact that most married couples cohabitate.76 Because most
married couples live together, they are thought to pay less in living expenses than
do single taxpayers and, therefore, have more money at their disposal.
77
However, this theory ignores the reality that many single taxpayers also
cohabitate-whether with a significant other, their families, or their friends-
and so they, too, can realize a comparable savings in their living expenses.78
Dual-income families in which both spouses earn relatively equal amounts
are the most susceptible to marriage penalties.79 As discussed earlier,80 such
couples will not enjoy the benefits of income splitting because, in effect, each
spouse is taxed at the same rate at which he or she would have been taxed had he
or she filed separately. Thus there is no incentive, other than convenience, for
filing jointly. Also, many of these same couples would pay less in taxes overall if
they were single rather than married, because the tax bracket for a married
couple is proportionately smaller-less than twice that of a single taxpayer-at
any given rate.81 Thus, many taxpayers are actually penalized when they choose
to work and marry an equal-earning spouse.
Conversely, it is those families with greater discrepancies in spousal
earnings that are the most likely to realize a marriage bonus.82 Although the tax
brackets for married taxpayers are proportionately smaller, they are still
gross income exceeds $100,000, while personal exemptions for married taxpayers begin to
phase out when the aggregate gross income of both spouses exceeds $150,000-an average of
only $75,000 per spouse. See I.R.C. § 151(dX3)(C) (1994 & Supp. I1 1997). Therefore,
taxpayers may lose out on the value of their personal exemptions-and thus incur a penalty-
simply because they many.
But one author wams: "Among the most egregious marriage penalties... in the Code,
however, are those associated with the earned income credit." Forman, supra note 71, at 8.
Such penalties are ironic considering that they arise out of a tax structure designed to impose
taxes in accordance with the taxpayer's ability to pay.
76 See Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the
Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CoNsT. L. 1171, 1188 (1995).
77 See id. at 1189.
78 See id.
79 See Brown, supra note 29, at 789. The average marriage bonus for households in
which one spouse makes significantly more than the other is about $1300. See Loven, supra
note 71, at *9.
80 See supra Part II.B.
81 For example, compare IJ.LC. § 1(a) (Supp. I 1997) with § I(c). For example, under
§ 1(c), a single taxpayer could earn up to $22,100 in 1997 at the 15% rate while, under § l(a)
or (d), a married couple could earn up to $36,900--an average of only $18,450 per spouse--at
the 15% rate.
82 See Brown, supra note 29, at 789.
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somewhat larger than those for single taxpayers.83 Therefore, if only one spouse
works, the sole breadwinner-typically the husband-may find himself in a
smaller tax bracket-and thus paying less in tax-than if he were single.84 The
higher-income spouse realizes a significant tax savings or "bonus" for having
married a much lower-income (or non-earning) spouse, and there is once again a
transfer of wealth from the lower-income spouse-typically the wife-to the
spouse who earns more money. Thus, the marriage bonus is yet another form of
social engineering, rewarding those taxpayers who marry into single-income
households. Because of this potential marriage bonus, along with the potential
tax savings to be derived from income splitting, many married women who earn
significantly less than their husbands will agree to file a joint return and thus be
held jointly and severally liable for the taxes that are owed.
D. Joint and Several Liability
Many married couples file joint returns in order to take advantage of the
benefits of income splitting.85 However, the cost of filing jointly is that each
spouse is held jointly and severally liable for the taxes owed under a joint
return.86 Prior to the enactment of the innocent spouse provision,87 a wife's
involvement in her husband's finances was in no way determinative of her
liability. If she signed the joint return, she was jointly and severally liable for the
full amount of taxes owed.88
83 See supra note 81 and accompanying text. In 1997, a single taxpayer could have gross
income of up to $22,100 at the 15% rate, while a married couple could have up to $36,900 at
the 15% rate. See supra note 81.
84 For example, under I.R.C. § l(c), a single taxpayer with $30,000 in gross income in
1997 fell within the 28% tax bracket. However, if he were married and his wife's gross income
did not exceed $6900-so that their total income did not exceed $36,900-the taxpayer would
find himself in the 15% bracket under §'(a) and thus realize a significant tax savings because
he was married. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997).
85 Newsday reported in 1994 that 99% of American couples file jointly in order save on
taxes. See Cummins, supra note 25. For a discussion of the benefits of income splitting, see
supra Part Ill.B.
86 See I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (1994).
87 See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063,2063 (enacting I.R.C.
§ 6013(e) (1970-71)).
88 See, e.g., Scudder v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 36 (1967), rev'd, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir.
1968). In Scudder, the Tax Court held that the wife was liable for a deficiency attributable to
funds her husband had embezzled from a partnership owned by the wife. The court stated,
however, that it was "appalled at the harshness of this result... " See 48 T.C. at 41. The Sixth
Circuit reversed the holding on the ground that the husband had fraudulently obtained his
wife's signature. See 405 F.2d at 227.
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Joint and several liability posed serious problems for women whose
husbands filed bankruptcy or simply ran from the IRS. Many of these women
were readily found because they stayed behind to care for their families. 89 Joint
and several liability has meant that, at the very least, many of these women
would face years, even decades, of harassment from the IRS for taxes owed on
income that, unbeknownst to them, their husbands failed to report under a joint
return. 90 At worst, joint and several liability has meant that many women raising
families on their own would be left destitute because the IRS would seize their
life's savings.91
It was not until 1971 that Congress would respond with what it believed to
be the answer to alleviating the problems associated with joint and several
liability: The innocent spouse provision.92 But even after the most recent
changes, enacted in 1998,93 the innocent spouse provision fails to address the
root of the problems facing married women under the Tax Code-
discrimination. Rather than amending the Tax Code so that married women are
taxed on an equal basis with their husbands and without any disincentives to
establishing financial independence, the innocent spouse provision merely
attempts to soften the blows of discrimination and, in the process, furthers the
victimization of women.
III. THE U.S. TAX CODE AND THE VIcTmmZATION OF WOMEN: A
TRADITION LIVES ON THROUGH THE INNOCENT SPOUSE PROVISION
Changes were recently enacted to the innocent spouse provision 94 because
relief was far too limited under the old law. But even under these newly
expanded rules, the innocent spouse provision fails to give women adequate
relief from the injustices of joint and several liability. The failure lies in the fact
that the law extracts too high a price for relief: A woman's dignity. In order to
fully appreciate the inequities of the innocent spouse provision, it is necessary to
examine the shortcomings of the old law and the reasons the rules were
expanded.
89 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
90 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
9 1 See id.
92 See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, § 1.
93 See 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified at I.R.C.




A. Relieffor Innocent Spouses Under the Old Law: The Lucky Spouse
Rule95
The IMS first offered married taxpayers the option of filing a joint return in
order to make filing more convenient.96 The benefit today is that a married
couple may also incur a lower tax liability on their total income than if each
spouse were to file separately.97 However, there is a cost. Section 6013(d)
imposes joint and several liability on each of the spouses filing ajoint return. 9 8 In
effect, the married couple is treated as a single entity.99
Joint and several liability may have been imposed to avoid the complications
95
"[C]urrently, this provision is in such a quagmire that lawyers and tax
practitioners ... have referred to the applicable code section as the 'lucky spouse rule'-
because it is so hard to qualify for the shelter of its safe harbor." Paul F. Wright, Taxation-
Innocent Spouse Provision-Of Erroneous Deductions and Decisions-From 6013(E) to
6015--The Knowledge Requirement and the Deduction Quagmire of the Internal Revenue
Code, 39 S. Tax. L. REv. 845, 849 (1998) (citation omitted).
9 6 See Ted S. Biderman, The Continued Folly of the Innocent Spouse Defense: Is it
Viable?, 45 DRAKE L. REv. 551, 552 (1997) (arguing that the IRS could relax the standards
imposed under the innocent spouse provision and thus provide for expanded relief). According
to Assistant Treasury Secretary Donald Lubbick, joint returns simplify the filing obligations of
approximately 49 million married couples and, in turn, reduce the resources that the IRS must
otherwise devote to processing returns for married couples by up to 50%. See Lubbick, Joint
Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra note 3.
97 The Revenue Act of 1948 introduced "income splitting." Under the income splitting
scheme, a married couple who filed jointly would be taxed at the married rate applicable to
only one-half of their total income. See Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301(d), 62 Stat. 110,
114. Because the tax rate schedules are progressive in nature, a lower marginal tax rate should
result when the rate applicable to each spouse is so based on only one-half of the couple's total
income. See Natalie Hoyer Keller, Do You, Elizabeth, Promise to Pay John's Taxes? I Do: A
Review of The Innocent Spouse Provisions and a Proposal for Change, 1996 UTAH L. REV.
1065, 1068 (1996). But as Keller points out, "given the tax rates currently in effect, many
double-income couples with nearly equal earnings no longer enjoy the benefits of income
splitting, resulting in the so-called 'marriage penalty."' Id. For a more detailed discussion of
income splitting and marriage penalties and bonuses, see supra Parts 1I.B-C.
98 The Code states that "if a joint return is made, the tax shall be computed on the
aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several." I.R.C.
§ 6013(d)(3) (1994).
99 The Bureau of Internal Revenue issued a ruling in 1923 indicating that it intended to
impose joint and several liability on taxpayers filing joint returns, based on the belief that a
married couple filing jointly constituted a single entity and that "a single joint return is one
return of a taxable unit, not two units on one sheet of paper." I.T. 1575, 11-1 C.B. 144 (1923).
Joint and several liability was formally enacted under the Revenue Act of 1938, following the
Ninth Circuit's rejection ofjoint liability in Cole v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935).
See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289 § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447,476 (1938).
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and costs of apportioning liability. 100 The implications are serious, considering
that joint and several liability is imposed even if all of the earnings are
attributable to only one spouse, and even if the couple later divorces or
separates. 101 The terms of any divorce decree or separation agreement which
attempt to relieve a spouse ofjoint and several liability will be ineffectual. 10 2
Divorced or separated taxpayers may suffer even greater consequences in
community property states.10 3 Under community property laws, each spouse
owns half of all community property and must report half of the community
income on his or her return, even if the spouses file separately.104 Thus, each
spouse is liable for the tax on half of the other spouse's earned income even if all
of the community income is attributable to only one spouse.105 Community
property laws also impact the income and assets that the IRS may look to for
payment of outstanding taxes, including those tax liabilities that are attributable
to only one spouse and that arose prior to the marriage.
10 6
100 See Cole, 81 F.2d at 487-88, in which the IRS argued that the joint return did not
segregate the income and expenses of one spouse from those of another, and it would thus be
impossible to apportion liability.
101 See Study of Certain Joint Return and Community Property Issues for Divorced and
Separated Taxpayers, I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371, available in 1996 WL 121250.
102 See id The General Accounting Office cites two reasons why the IRS cannot be
bound by divorce decrees, namely: (1) federal tax issues are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
certain federal courts and therefore could not be resolved in a divorce proceeding, which
normally would fall within the jurisdiction of a state court; and (2) binding the IRS by such
decrees would require the IRS to participate in all divorce settlements--of which there were
1.2 million in 1994-in order to protect its interests, and could thwart IRS collection efforts by
imposing full responsibility for taxes on the spouse who, under the decree, has agreed to
relinquish to the other spouse all interests in the assets against which the IRS could otherwise
impose a lien. See Joint Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998)
(statement of Lynda D. Willis, Director of Tax Policy and Administrative Issues, General
Government Division), available in 1998 WL 8992861 [hereinafter Willis, Joint Liability and
its Impact on Innocent Spouses].
103 The community property states are Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Taxes and Marital Situations, supra
note 53, at *2.
10 4 See Poe v. Seabom, 282 U.S. 101, 111-12 (1930).
105 See id at 112.
106 "[S]uppose a woman divorces, remarries, and now lives in a community property
state, and there are unpaid taxes from the last joint return she filed with her first husband. The
IRS may levy her wages and the wages of her second husband, since-under community
property laws she owns half of his income." Taxes and Marital Situations, supra note 53, at
*3.
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1. The Innocent Spouse Provisions: A BriefHistory
While the inequity of imposing joint and several liability on certain
taxpayers who filed joint returns became more evident after World War ]I,107 it
was not until 1971 that Congress responded by enacting the first version of what
is known as the "innocent spouse provision." 108 This new provision provided
conditional relief for certain taxpayers who filed a joint return but who did not
know, and had no reason to know, that their spouses had failed to disclose
income to the IRS. 0 9 In effect, the provision absolved only those taxpayers who
did not significantly benefit from a substantial understatement of tax.11°
Although equitable in nature, the innocent spouse provision was inept at
providing adequate relief, due to the Tax Court's prevailing concern for lost tax
107 Increased awareness of the problem is attributed not only to the increases in divorce
and IRS collection activities, but also to the Supreme Court's ruling in James v. United States,
366 U.S. 213, 224 (1961), that embezzled funds are taxable. James led to IRS efforts to collect
taxes on embezzled funds from "innocent spouses." See Wright, supra note 95, at 853.
108 See Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, § 1, 84 Stat. 2063, 2063 (enacting
I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1970)).
109 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(1), 112 Stat. 740 (1998). Congress also enacted I.R.C. § 66 (1994), invalidating
community property laws for federal income tax purposes and, in particular, for determining
certain income attributable to an innocent spouse who filed a separate return in a community
property state. See Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 101(a), 94 Stat.
3521, 3521 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 66 (1994)). The enactment of§ 66 overruled Poe,
282 U.S. 101 in part, by providing that tax would be assessed in full against the spouse who
earned, managed, or controlled the relevant income if: (1) the spouses lived apart for the entire
year, (2) the spouses filed separate returns; (3) either spouse had income which was community
income; and (4) no portion of the community income was transferred from one spouse to the
other during the year in question. See I.R.C. § 66 (1994).
110 See Treasury Decision 7320-Innocent Spouses, 1974-2 C.B. 391, 392 (Jul. 30,
1974) (advising that in determining whether it is inequitable to hold the spouse liable for a
deficiency, one factor to be considered is whether the spouse significantly benefited, either
directly or indirectly, from the omission of income). Compare, e.g., Purcell v. Commissioner,
86 T.C. 228, 243 (1986) (granting innocent spouse relief because the taxpayer did not
significantly benefit from omissions of income that were attributable to her husband) with
Winnett v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 802, 812-13 (1991) (denying innocent spouse relief, in part,
because the taxpayer received an entire tax refund, under a divorce settlement, that resulted
from a substantial understatement of tax owed and thus she significantly benefited from the
understatement). In Purcell, the husband did transfer property to the taxpayer under a large
divorce settlement, but he acquired the property in years prior to any understatement of tax and
thus the wife's acquisition of the property was not attributable to an omission of income. See
Purcell, 86 T.C. at 243.
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revenues. 111 While other sections of the Tax Code place the burden of proof on
the IRS when levying penalties, the Tax Court required the taxpayer who sought
relief under the innocent spouse provision to prove each of the necessary
elements by a preponderance of the evidence. 112 In 1984, Congress attempted to
liberalize the innocent spouse provision by extending relief beyond those cases
involving the omission of income to cases involving deficiencies from
disallowed deductions, credits, and basis adjustments. 113 However, this
111 See Wyrick, supra note 23, at 166. The IRS shared the Tax Court's concern for lost
revenues. In his IRS National Taxpayer Advocate Report to Congress earlier this year, W. Val
Oveson stated:
During my years in the tax business, I became familiar with the phrase, "protecting
the interests of the government" Studying RRA 98 and applying the spirit as well as the
letter of the law, I am convinced that Congress liberated the IRS from this philosophy,
where the phrase "protecting the interest of the government" means "maximizing the
revenue to the government" It is obvious to me that Congress intends that the IRS will
balance the interest of the taxpayer with the interest of the government This balanced
approach will require the IRS to walk away from issues and situations that they may not
have done in the past.
IRS National Taxpayer Advocate Report to Congress: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of W. Val
Overson, National Taxpayer Advocate of the I.R.S.), available in 1999 WL 8084567. The IRS
is trying to change its approach by removing taxpayer penalty assessments as one of the criteria
in performance evaluations. See I.R.S. News Release IR-98-3 (Jan. 28, 1998) (statement of
Charles 0. Rossotti, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Before the Senate Finance
Committee), available in 1998 WL 28310. Thus, there should be little incentive, if any, for the
IRS regional and district offices to assess unwarranted penalties. See id.
In addition to being overly concerned about lost revenues, the Tax Court is less proficient
in handling the innocent spouse provision because it is a court of law, not equity; yet it hears
almost all of the innocent spouse cases that are tried. See Jerome Borison, Alice Through a
Very Dark and Confusing Looking Glass: Getting Equity from the Tax Court in Innocent
Spouse Cases, 30 FAM. L.Q. 123, 124 (1996). "In innocent spouse cases... the Tax Court
judges are like fish out of water. Though their decisions are couched in terms of rules of law
and stare decisis, the judges flounder around in the turbulent sea of equity, deciding cases on
what appears to be an arbitrary basis." I at 125.
112See Wyrick, supra note 23, at 166; see also Sonnenborn v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
373,381 (1971).
113 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 494, 801
(1984) (amending I.R.C. § 6013(eX2) (1982)). Congress also amended section 66, providing
innocent spouse relief for certain taxpayers in community property states who might otherwise
be held liable for a tax deficiency relating to an omission of community income. See Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(b), 98 Stat. 494, 803 (enacting I.R.C.
§ 66(c) (Supp. 1m 1985)). The taxpayer seeking relief under section 66(c) must ordinarily show
that the community income was derived from their spouse's separate property of which the
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amendment also proved inept. 114 Its failure is attributed in part to the income
limitations that Congress imposed on individuals seeking relief under the new
provision.115 In addition, the tax regulations were never revised to reflect the
1984 amendment,116 and, because the crucial elements of the innocent spouse
provision remained essentially the same,1 17 the courts continued to look to the
old regulations for guidance. 18 Consequently, Congress' promise of expanded
relief was disappointing. 119
The "old" innocent spouse provision failed because the statutory
requirements remained too complex and the courts' interpretations too
inconsistent. 120 One tax specialist advised practitioners who were handling
innocent spouse cases to scrutinize case law for analogous fact situations because
"[t]he innocent spouse provision is litigated often, and the decisions are replete
with inconsistency, often making it possible to find favorable precedent."'121
Prior to the 1998 enactment, some commentators argued that the innocent spouse
provision should be repealed and joint and several liability abandoned
taxpayer did not know or have reason to know, and that it would be inequitable to hold the
taxpayer liable. See I.R.C. § 66(c)(3)-(4) (1994).
114 Newsday reported in 1994 that up to 99% of American couples file jointly, and 15,000
taxpayers file innocent spouse cases each year. Only 200 of those cases are appealed to the
U.S. Tax Court, and in two-thirds of these the taxpayers lose. See Cummins, supra note 25.
Considering that the IRS has had no procedures in place for reviewing innocent spouse claims
and that many IRS employees know nothing about the provision, see supra note 14 and
accompanying text, it is safe to say that the innocent spouse provision has been of little avail to
innocent spouses.
1 15 See generally Bums, supra note 14.
116 See Willis, Joint Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra note 102, at * 17.
117 See joint Returns, I.R.C. § 6013, Explanation, [1998 Transfer Binder] Stand. Fed. Tax
Rep. (CCH) 36,471.09.
118 See id.; see also Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 228, 241 (1986) (denying innocent
spouse relief because the taxpayer received a "substantial benefit" from the omissions or
wrongfully claimed deductions, despite the fact that the 1984 amendment struck the
requirement that a substantial benefit could not have been received).
119 See Cummins, supra note 25, at 76 (reporting that, each year, tens of thousands of
Americans suffer the inequities of joint and several liability and that the "labyrinthian
requirements" of the innocent spouse provision work against both poor taxpayers and women).
120 See Current Developments, Pending Legislation, Tax Treatment of Innocent Spouses,
[1998 Transfer Binder] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 45,925.
121 Silvija A. Strikis, Elements Required for Qualifring as an Innocent Spouse Still Far
from Clear, 81 J. TAX'N 354, 359 (1994) (advising that "the decisions regarding innocent
spouse status cover too broad a spectrum for clear rules to be isolated," but giving guidelines to
help practitioners working with the innocent spouse provision).
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altogether, 122 while others argued that the Supreme Court should reconcile the
inconsistencies. 123 Everyone seemed to agree "that the defense is currently in a
state of confusion." 124
2. Statutory Requirements Under the Old Law
To qualify for relief under the innocent spouse provision, the taxpayer had to
establish by a preponderance of the evidence 125 that he or she met certain
statutory requirements, namely: (1) the taxpayer filed a joint return for the tax
year in question; (2) there was a substantial understatement of tax due to grossly
erroneous items on the return which were attributable to the taxpayer's spouse;
(3) the taxpayer signed the return, not knowing or having reason to know of the
understatement; and (4) under the facts and circumstances of the case, it would
have been inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable.126
122 See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Taxation Domestic Relations
Committee, supra note 21, at 395.
123 See Biderman, supra note 96, at 567.
124 Id.
125 See, eg., Adams v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 300, 303 (1973) (stating that, "[i]n order
to be relieved from liability as an 'innocent spouse,' petitioner must shoulder the burden of
proving that the three conditions of section 6013(e) are met and not just one of them");
Worthington v. United States, 882 F. Supp. 503, 507 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
126Wee I.R.C. § 6013(e) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. 685,740 (1998). Section 6013(e) read, in part:
Spouse relieved of liability in certain cases-
(1) In general. Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(A) ajoint return has been made under this section for a taxable year,
(B) on such return there is a substantial understatement of tax attributable to
grossly erroneous items of one spouse,
(C) the other spouse establishes that in signing the return he or she did not
know, and had no reason to know, that there was such substantial understatement, and
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold
the other spouse liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to such
substantial understatement,
then the other spouse shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest,
penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is
attributable to such substantial understatement.
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a. The Joint Return Requirement
The taxpayer who sought reprieve under the innocent spouse provision had
to first establish that a joint return was filed.127 The courts were most lenient
with this requirement; if both the taxpayer and his or her spouse signed the
return, it was presumed that the couple filed jointly.128
If the taxpayer failed to sign the joint return, the courts imposed the "tacit
consent rule" and asked whether the taxpayer intended (i.e. tacitly consented) to
filing a joint return, based upon his or her actions. 129 In determining the intent,
the courts would generally take into account the following: the couple's filing
status in prior years; whether the taxpayer enjoyed any of the benefits of the joint
return; and whether the joint return, as opposed to a separate return, was used to
report the income and expenses attributable to the taxpayer. 130 The taxpayer who
lived in a non community property state and who did not intend to file a joint
return need not invoke the protections of the innocent spouse provision; such a
taxpayer was held not to have filed a joint return and thus could not be held
jointly and severally liable.131
b. The Substantial Understatement of Tax Requirement
The second requirement for relief under the prior innocent spouse provision
was that there exist a substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly
erroneous items of the taxpayer's spouse.132 Because the provision required an
127 See id. at § 6013(e)(1)(A).
128 See, e.g., Wilkins v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 752, 755 (1953) (holding that if a
husband and wife both sign ajoint income tax return, the filing is in fact ajoint return).
129 See Federbush v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 740, 757-58 (1960), aff'dper curtam, 325
F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1963) (holding that "whether a joint return was filed rests on the intention of
the parties"); see also Heim v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 44, 48-49 (1958) (holding the
taxpayer liable for a tax deficiency attributable to her husband's unreported income because
she had acquiesced in, and given her tacit consent to, filing ajoint return).
130 See Ebeling v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. (CCH) 3102, 3103 (1994). Compare
Moretti v. Commissioner, 77 F.3d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the taxpayer had filed
a joint return, in part because of the fact that he and his wife had always filed jointly) with
McCord v. Granger, 201 F.2d 103, 108 (3rd Cir. 1952) (holding taxpayer to have filed a
separate return, in part because of fact that his wife had independently filed her own return).
131 See, e.g., Manton v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 831, 835-36 (1948) (holding that the
taxpayer had not filed a joint return and thus was not liable for deficiencies and penalties
assessed against her husband).
132 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. 685,740.
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actual understatement of tax, relief could not be granted to a taxpayer who was
held jointly and severally liable for an unpaid deficiency relating to an accurate
tax return, even if the taxpayer had set aside the appropriate funds and did not
know that his or her spouse had otherwise disposed of the money. 133
In order to be substantial, the understatement, not including accrued interest
and penalties, had to exceed the greater of five hundred dollars or a specified
percentage of the innocent spouse's adjusted gross income for the preadjustment
year.134 This limitation was criticized as arbitrary and unfair to low-income
taxpayers who failed to meet the threshold and were thus denied relief.135 The
law fell short of helping those most in need, especially considering that the
resulting penalties and interest often significantly outweighed the
understatement. 136 In addition, some critics argued that the limitation considered
the taxpayer's ability to pay or the degree of hardship suffered rather than his or
her innocence, absolving the taxpayer of liability only if the tax deficiency was
significant relative to the taxpayer's total adjusted gross income for the
preadjustment year.137
The standard for "grossly erroneous items" under the innocent spouse
provision 138 was also problematic.139 The Code defined such items as either
items of gross income that were attributable to the taxpayer's spouse and that
were omitted from gross income, 140 or as items of deduction, credit or basis that
1 3 3 See United States v. Bingham, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9368, at 83,869-70 (D.
Conn. 1978).
134 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(3)-(4) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, § 3201(e)(1). Under
sections 6013(eX4)(A) and (B), the applicable percentage threshold is 10% for adjusted gross
income of up to $20,000 for the preadjustment year, and 25% for adjusted gross income in
excess of $20,000 for the preadjustment year. See id
135 The threshold of $500 or, if greater, a specified percentage of the innocent spouse's
adjusted gross income for the preadjustment year, had a significant impact on the number of
taxpayers permitted to seek relief. For example, the General Accounting Office estimated that
generally, the innocent spouse provision allowed taxpayers to seek relief only if the deficiency
was at least $5000, and that this threshold may have disqualified 43,000 divorced taxpayers
from innocent spouse relief in 1992. See Bums, supra note 14, at *2.
136 See Biderman, supra note 96, at 554-55.
137 See Willis, Joint Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra note 102, at *7.
Additional criticisms include the fact that a taxpayer's adjusted gross income for the
preadjustment year is irrelevant to his ability to pay tax deficiencies assessed in a subsequent
year, especially considering that the notice of deficiency may not be issued until several years
after the year ofthe joint return in question. See id
138 See I.R.C. § 6013(eX2) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, § 3201(d)(1).
139 See Willis, Joint Liability and its Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra note 102.
140 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2XA) (1994), repealedby 1998 Act, § 3201(d)(1).
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were claimed in an amount that was without any basis in fact or law.141 Thus, if
the IRS made an upward adjustment to the taxpayer's gross income, the adjusted
item was considered grossly erroneous. However, the taxpayer seeking relief for
erroneous items of deduction, credit or basis bore the burden of proving that such
items had "no basis in fact or law."142 This standard presented particular
difficulties for taxpayers, given that the Code failed to define exactly what it
meant, and left it open to judicial interpretation. 143 The courts, in turn, defined
"no basis in fact or law" to mean "frivolous, fraudulent or... phony." 44 The
resultant burden placed the taxpayer in a "proverbial catch-twenty-two." 145
c. The Lack ofKnowledge Requirement
The third requirement for relief under the innocent spouse provision was
proving that the taxpayer did not know or have reason to know of the substantial
understatement. 146 The requirement was dually problematic not only because
two general standards had developed, one for omission-of-income cases and the
other for erroneous deduction cases, but also because judicial interpretation
varied among the circuits, the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals. 147
141 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, § 3201(d)(1).
142 See [1998 Transfer Binder] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 45,925, at 75,854.
14 3 See Wright, supra note 95, at 857. Lynda D. Willis testified on behalf of the General
Accounting Office that "[t]he distinction between a deduction having no basis in fact or law
versus its just being erroneous is difficult to comprehend." See Willis, Joint Liability and its
Impact on Innocent Spouses, supra note 102, at *8.
144 See Wright, supra note 95, at 857; see also Douglas v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 758,
763 (1986) ("Ordinarily, a deduction having no basis in fact or in law can be described as
frivolous, fraudulent, or, to use the word of the committee report, phony.'); Purcell v.
Commissioner, 826 F.2d 470, 475 (6th Cir. 1987) ("[The tax court has interpreted the term
'grossly erroneous items' to mean deductions or credits that are 'fraudulent,' 'frivolous,'
'phony,' or 'groundless."').
145 To illustrate: "If the wife is able to prove the phoniness of the deduction in the year of
trial, the IRS may argue she could have done so in the year the return was filed and, therefore,
she had reason to know of the understatement and should be denied relief on that ground."
Biderman, supra note 96, at 556.
146 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, § 3201(d)(1).
147 See generally Wright, supra note 95, at 864-66 (providing a detailed discussion of the
inconsistencies in judicial interpretation). The procedures for going before the U.S. Tax Court
are significantly different from those of the other federal courts. If a taxpayer cannot settle a
dispute with the IRS but has already paid the amount in dispute, the taxpayer must sue for a
refund in either the Federal District Court (a generalist court which provides the taxpayer with
the option of a jury trial) or the Court of Federal Claims (a semi-expert court). Otherwise, the
taxpayer can litigate his case in the U.S. Tax Court, an expert court that is the best-suited to
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Generally, the Tax Court has held fast to imposing on every taxpayer the
duty to review his or her tax return prior to signing.148 Other courts have
employed the "prudent taxpayer standard" in deternining the taxpayer's duty to
review his or her return, 149 and have held that a spouse has reason to know of a
substantial understatement if "a reasonably prudent taxpayer under the
circumstances at the time of signing the return could be expected to know that
the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further investigation was
warranted." 150 These other courts would consider: (1) the taxpayer's level of
education; (2) his or her involvement in the family's financial affairs; (3)
whether expenditures appeared lavish or unusual relative to the family's past
levels of income, standard of living, and spending habits, which would have put
the taxpayer on notice of a potential understatement; and (4) whether the
taxpayer's spouse was evasive or deceitful concerning the couple's finances.151
The standard for a taxpayer's duty to review his or her return having been
set, the majority of courts employed the "knowledge of the transaction test" for
omission-of-income cases, asking "whether the spouse seeking relief knew or
should have known of an income-producing transaction that the other spouse
failed to report."'152 These courts imposed a duty to investigate and denied the
taxpayer relief if he or she had knowledge of the underlying transaction which
produced the income in question.153 The treatment of erroneous deduction cases,
on the other hand, was altogether inconsistent.1 54 The Tax Court held that mere
knowledge of the deduction precluded relief under the innocent spouse
provision.155 Other courts recognized that under the Tax Court's standard, relief
was unattainable; the taxpayer had a duty to review the tax return, should have
seen the deduction, and would have thus failed the "should have known"
handle complex tax issues. The choice of forum will depend largely on whether the taxpayer
has already paid the disputed amount and what precedent, if any, has been set in the respective
courts. See JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS 10 (1998).
148 See Wright, supra note 95, at 857; see also Cohen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. 944,
946 (1987).
149 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 95, at 857; Kistner v. Commissioner, 18 F.3d 1521, 1521
(11 th Cir. 1994); Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,965 (9th Cir. 1989).
1 50 SeeKistner, 18 F.3d at 1527.
151 See Wright, supra note 95, at 858; see also Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d
1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1993); Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,965 (9th Cir. 1989).
152 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 95, at 862; Reser v. Commissioner, 112 F.3d 1258, 1265
(5th Cir. 1997).
15 3 See Wright, supra note 95, at 862.
15 4 See Reser, 112 F.3d at 1266; see also Wright, supra note 95, at 862-69.
15 5 See Reser, 112 F.3d at 1266; see also Bokum v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990).
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standard. 156 So, these courts instead chose a more equitable standard: They
would inquire "whether the spouse seeking relief knew or had reason to know
that the deduction would give rise to a substantial understatemenf ' 157 and would
consider the same factors-such as the taxpayer's level of education and his or
her involvement in the family's financial affairs--that were relevant in omission-
of-income cases to determine whether the taxpayer should have known of the
erroneous deduction. 158
d. The Equity Requirement
The final requirement under the innocent spouse provision was that the
taxpayer had to prove that it was inequitable to hold him or her liable for the
understatement. 159 Not surprisingly, this element was also problematic because
it, too, was open to judicial interpretation. 160 The confusion arising out of the
provision was due, in part, to language which was originally imposed under the
1971 provision: In order to relieve the taxpayer of liability, he or she could not
have received a substantial benefit from the understatement. 161 The Tax Reform
Act of 1984 attempted to broaden relief by removing this language. 162 However,
because new regulations were never published in 1984 and because the courts
continued to rely on the 1971 regulations, this "unwritten" requirement remained
firmly embedded in the courts' application of the law.163
156 See Wright, supra note 95, at 867-68.
157 Reser, 112 F.3d at 1266. For an additional application of this standard, see Erdahl v.
Commissioner, 930 F.2d 585, 589 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that mere knowledge of the
transaction that gave rise to an erroneous deduction did not, by itself, preclude innocent spouse
relief.
158 See Wright, supra note 95, at 868; see also Reser, 112 F.3d at 1268, 1272 (holding
that, despite her legal education, the taxpayer had no special knowledge of complex tax issues,
was not involved in her husband's business affairs, did not enjoy a lavish lifestyle, and was
thus entitled to relief under the innocent spouse provision).
159 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(D) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(d)(1), 112 Stat. 685, 737.
160 See Wright, supra note 95, at 858.
161 See I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (Supp. 1971).
162 See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 424(a), 98 Stat. 494, 801
(1984) (amending I.R.C. § 6013(e)(1)(C) (1982)).
163 See Wright, supra note 95, at 858-59; see also Purcell v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 112,
119 (1986); supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. In Purcell, the court stated:
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In determining whether the spouse significantly benefited from the
understatement, the courts generally looked to see whether the spouse realized a
benefit substantially different from his or her normal family lifestyle. 164 If there
was a substantial difference, the courts held that the taxpayer was on notice of
income that should have been reflected on the tax return and that it was equitable
to hold the taxpayer liable for the benefit that he or she enjoyed.165 The problem
inherent in this requirement is the fact that equity is a principal whereby the
courts may provide relief which the law otherwise cannot. Yet under the
innocent spouse provision, the courts imposed this requirement as an additional
hurdle for the innocent spouse to clear 166 rather than as a collateral measure of
relief.
Whereas the law prior to the 1984 amendment specifically referred to whether the
spouse claiming relief from tax significantly benefited from the omissions from income,
the present law does not specifically contain this provision. However, even though the
present statute does not specifically refer to the other spouse receiving substantial benefits
from the omissions or wrongfully claimed deductions, in our view it would not be
inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency if such substantial benefits
were received.
Purcell, 86 T.C. at 119.
164 See Biderman, supra note 96, at 558; see also Pietromonaco v. Commissioner, 3 F.3d
1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 1993) (granting innocent spouse relief, in part, because the taxpayer
made no lavish expenditures and because her standard of living remained constant during the
tax years in which there was an understatement).
165 See Biderman, supra note 96, at 558; see also Stevens v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d
1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding the taxpayer liable because her "personal lifestyle
became increasingly opulent").
166 See Wright, supra note 95, at 859.
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B. Relieffor Innocent Spouses Under the New Law: The Luckier Spouse
Rule167
Congress enacted section 3201 of the 1998 Act to once again broaden relief
under the innocent spouse provisions, as it realized that the innocent spouse
exemption "has been the subject of extensive litigation with outcomes that are
sometimes inconsistent, sometimes facially inequitable, and sometimes
controversial. ' 168 The enactment was actually a compromise between the House,
which favored retaining the innocent spouse exemption but making it easier to
qualify for relief, and the Senate, which would have eliminated the exemption
altogether and replaced it with an election to apportion liability between joint
filers. 169  What resulted in the compromise was a "hybridized
version... containing elements of both [the] Senate and House versions, but
applying them in different situations."'1 70 In any event the Congressional
Research Service indicated in its report to Congress that reform of the innocent
spouse provisions would "eliminate or modify many of the most criticized
provisions of prior law .... "171
167 Advisors warn that if a taxpayer anticipates getting divorced or separated, planning
ahead could increase his or her chances of success in the event that the taxpayer subsequently
elects relief under the innocent spouse provision. See generally George G. Jones & Mark A.
Luscombe, Reform Offers Innocent Spouses Help, and New Pitfalls, Accr. TODAY, Sept 28-
Oct. 11, 1998, at 26. Likewise, a taxpayer entering a divorce or separation agreement should
consider the fact that his or her spouse could unilaterally overturn joint and several liability at a
subsequent point in time. See id. at 26. Taxpayers might also want to consider the timing of an
anticipated divorce or separation-within two years after collection activities begin-so as to
meet the deadlines for a separate liability election under the innocent spouse provision. See id
at 29. However, there has been some controversy about the timing of this election. See id.
Some advisors recommend that taxpayers make a "protective" election "as a matter of course
in any divorce or separation." Id. But others say that such an election could tip the IRS off that
one of the spouses may have filed an inaccurate return and thus precipitate an audit. See id
There is even speculation within the IRS that such an election might be prohibited in order to
prevent a flood of paperwork. See id. In any event, taxpayers should not pay an assessment for
a deficiency without first considering a possible election under the innocent spouse provision.
See id. at 26. If the deficiency has been paid, an election cannot be made to secure a refund. See
id. at 29.






1. Who May Seek Relief Under the New Law?
The new law applies not only to liabilities arising after July 22, 1998, but
also to liabilities that remain unpaid as of that date. 172 As a result, many
taxpayers who were akeady involved in the collection process will be entitled to
seek relief under the expanded rules.173 In order to invoke the protections of the
new law, any taxpayer seeking relief for liabilities arising after July 22, 1998,
under a joint return 174 must elect one of the three Rules 175 described below,176
no later than two years after the Commissioner has initiated collection
activities. 177 The collection activities must be made in such a manner so as to
notify the taxpayer of the IRS's intent to collect payment of the deficiencyfrom
that taxpayer.178 For tax liabilities that are outstanding as of the enactment date,
the two year limitation period begins to toll on the date of the first collection
172 See 1998 Act, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201(g), 112 Stat. 685,740.
173 In order to consider granting relief to taxpayers whose cases were pending at the time
of the enactment, the IRS suspended approximately 2000 innocent spouse cases until interim
guidelines for the new provisions were issued. See Interim Guidelines for "Equitable Relief'
for Innocent Spouses, I.R.S. News Release, IR-98-73 (Dec. 7, 1998), available in 1998 WL
857065. The interim guidelines were issued late in December 1998, and are in effect until a
formal set of guidelines is finalized. See id
174 Relief under I.R.C. § 6015 is available to taxpayers who file joint returns, whether in a
community or non-community property states. See 1998 Act, § 3201(a) (stating in relevant
part: "Any determination under this section shall be made without regard to community
property laws').
175 Rule I provides expanded relief for innocent spouses under § 6015(b); Rule II allows
a separate liability election under § 6015(c) for certain divorced or legally separated taxpayers;
§ 6015(a)(2) entitles those taxpayers electing relief under Rule I to also elect relief under Rule
II; Rule III provides equitable relief under I.R.C. § 6015(f), but an election under Rule IlI is
conditioned on the failure of the taxpayer to qualify for relief under both Rules I and II. See
I.R.C. § 6015 (West Supp. 1999).
17 6 See discussion, infra Parts llI.B.2.a-c.
17 7 See I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(E), (c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1999), respectively. Relief under
Rule I requires that the taxpayer first elect, but not qualify for, relief under Rules I and II. See
I.R.C. § 6015(f)(2). Thus, a Rule III election must essentially be made within the same time-
frame as for Rules I and II.
178 See [1998 Transfer Binder] Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 36,485 at 62,733-38. Thus,
the statute of limitations would begin to toll upon the IRS's garnishment of the taxpayer's
wages or notice of levy against his or her property, either activity signaling the IRS's intent to
collect payment from that taxpayer rather than from the taxpayer's spouse. A notice of
deficiency and demand for payment that is addressed to both the taxpayer and his or her spouse
would not provide the taxpayer with sufficient notice that payment was sought from the




activity occurring after July 22, 1998.179 Finally, under similar time frames,
taxpayers in community property states who filed separate returns may seek
relief under the expanded equity provisions of section 66(c). 180
2. Electing Innocent Spouse Relieffrom Liability Under a Joint Return:
Rules , H, and LI.
Under Rule I, section 6015(b) expands the relief available to taxpayers
seeking innocent spouse protection and contains a modified version of the rules
formerly found under section 6013(e). 181 In addition, under Rule II, section
6015(c) allows certain divorced or separated taxpayers who are assessed a tax
deficiency that is attributable to the taxpayer's spouse to elect separate
liability.182 If the taxpayer proves that he or she signed the joint return under
179 See 1998 Act, § 3201(g)(2). The collection activity must be as described under supra
note 111.
180 SeeI.R.C. § 66(c) (1994), amended by 1998 Act, § 3201(b).
181 See I.R.C. § 6015(b) (West Supp. 1999), which states in part:
Procedures for relief from liability applicable to all joint filers.
(1) In general. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(A) ajoint return has been made for a taxable year,
(B) on such return there is an understatement of tax attributable to erroneous
items of one individual filing the joint return;
(C) the other individual filing the joint return establishes that in signing the
return he or she did not know, and had no reason to know, that there was such
understatement,
(D) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold
the other individual liable for the deficiency in tax for such taxable year attributable to
such understatements; and
(B) the other individual elects (in such form as the Secretary may prescribe) the
benefits of this subsection not later than the date which is 2 years after the date the
Secretary has begun collection activities with respect to the individual making the
election,
then the other individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest,
penalties, and other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such liability is
attributable to such understatement.
(3) Understatement. For purposes of this subsection, the term "understatement" has
the meaning given to such term by section 6662(d)(2)(A).
182 The Code provides:
Procedures to limit liability for taxpayers no longer married or taxpayers legally
separated or not living together.
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duress, the separate liability election is unavailable 183 because it will be found
that a joint return was never filed and thus the taxpayer is not liable for any of the
representations made on the return.184 For those taxpayers who fail to qualify for
protection under the innocent spouse and separate liability provisions, section
6015(f) may provide equitable relief under Rule 1i1 85
a. Rule I: Expanded Innocent Spouse Relief
A taxpayer seeking innocent spouse protection for a tax deficiency will find
relief under section 6015(b) if he or she can establish the following: (1) the
taxpayer filed a joint return for the year in question; (2) there was an
understatement of tax due to erroneous items on the return which were
attributable to the taxpayer's spouse; (3) the taxpayer signed the return, not
knowing or having reason to know of the understatement; and (4) under the facts
(1) In general. Except as provided in this subsection, if an individual who has
made a joint return for any taxable year elects the application of this subsection, the
individual's liability for any deficiency which is assessed with respect to the return shall
not exceed the portion of such deficiency properly allocable to the individual under
subsection (d).
I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
183 The Code provides:
Election not valid with respect to certain deficiencies. If the Secretary demonstrates
that an individual making an election under this subsection had actual knowledge, at the
time such individual signed the return, of any item giving rise to a deficiency (or portion
thereof) which is not allocable to such individual under subsection (d), such election shall
not apply to such deficiency (or portion). This subparagraph shall not apply where the
individual with actual knowledge establishes that such individual signed the return under
duress.
I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1999).
184 Interim Guidance for Equitable Relieffrom Joint and Several Liability, I.R.S. Notice
98-61, 1998-51 I.1B. 13, available in 1998 WL 858240.
185 The Code provides:
Equitable relief. Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if-
(1) taking into account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
individual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency (or any portion of either); and
(2) relief is not available to such individual under subsection (b) or (c), the Secretary
may relieve such individual of such liability.
I.R.C. § 6015(f) (West Supp. 1999).
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and circumstances of the case, it would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer
liable. 186 If the taxpayer fails to establish that he or she did not know or have
reason to know of the understatement, relief may still be granted to the extent
that the taxpayer did not know or have a reason to know of any portion of the
understatement.' 87 Thus, the taxpayer will be absolved of liability for that
portion of the understatement for which he or she is innocent, but will be held
liable for that portion for which he or she is culpable. If the IRS denies an
election for innocent spouse relief or fails to make a ruling, the taxpayer may
petition the Tax Court for review of the application within 90 days after the
earlier of the date on which a determination is mailed by the IRS, or six months
after the date on which the taxpayer filed the election. 188
The new law relaxes the second element under the innocent spouse
provision, which formerly required the taxpayer to prove that there was a
substantial understatement of tax attributable to grossly erroneous items of the
taxpayer's spouse.189 Under the new law, the understatement need no longer
186 See I.R.C. § 6015(b) (West Supp. 1999).
187 The Code provides:
Apportionment of relief. If an individual who, but for paragraph (1)(C), would be
relieved of liability under paragraph (1), establishes that in signing the return such
individual did not know, and had no reason to know, the extent of such understatement,
then such individual shall be relieved of liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent that such liability is attributable to the
portion of such understatement of which such individual did not know and had no reason
to know.
I.R.C. § 6015(b)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
188 The Code provides:
Petition for review by Tax Court.
(1) In general. In the case of an individual who elects to have subsection (b) or
(c) apply-
(A) In general. The individual may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax
Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the appropriate relief available to the individual
under this section if such petition is filed during the 90-day period beginning on the date
on which the Secretary malls by certified or registered mail a notice to such individual of
the Secretary's determination of relief available to the individual. Notwithstanding the
preceding sentence, an individual may file such petition at any time after the date which is
6 months after the date such election is filed with the Secretary and before the close of
such 90-day period.
I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
189 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999). See supra Part IH.B.2 for a discussion
of the four requirements of the "old" provision.
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exceed a threshold amount, and therefore, must no longer be "substantial."1 90
Thus, the provision no longer weighs the taxpayer's ability to pay the deficiency,
but considers only the taxpayer's innocence. The revision also eliminates the
arbitrary unfairness to poorer taxpayers for whom the threshold limit 91 or, if
greater a limit set at a specified percentage of the innocent spouse's adjusted
gross income for the preadjustment year, meant that relief could more likely be
denied.
In addition, the item that the understatement is attributable to need not be
"grossly eroneous" 192 but merely "erroneous." 193 Eliminating this threshold
from the provision should mean that the same standard will be imposed for items
of deduction, credit, and basis as for items of gross income, rather than a
different standard as formerly prescribed by the Code under the definition of
"grossly erroneous."' 94 As a consequence, courts will no longer need to interpret
for themselves the meaning of "no basis in fact or law" as applied to items of
deduction, credit, and basis,195 and taxpayers will no longer face the formidable
task of proving a negative proposition that the items were claimed without any
such basis. 196
Under section 3201 of the 1998 Act, the Chief Counsel must clarify the tests
for the third and fourth requirements under the new innocent spouse
provision,197 namely that the taxpayer seeking relief did not know or have reason
to know of the erroneous item,198 and that it is inequitable to hold the taxpayer
liable for the tax deficiency.' 99 Clarification of the appropriate standards should
lead to greater consistency in the courts.
b. Rule I Separate Liability Election
In addition to electing innocent spouse relief under Rule I, a taxpayer may be
eligible for relief under section 6015(c) and have his or her liability limited to the
190 See I.RC. § 6015(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
191 See supra note 135.
192 As formerly required under I.RC. § 6013(e)(1)(B) (1994), repealed by 1998 Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, § 3201(e)(1), 112 Stat. 685, 740 (1998).
193 I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
194 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
195 See I.RC. § 6013(e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
19 6 Seesupra Part III.A.2.b.
197 See Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3201(a), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 6015).
198 See I.R C. § 6015(b)(1XC) (West Supp. 1999).
199 See I.R.C. § 6015(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1999).
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amount of the deficiency, if any, that is attributable to items allocable to him or
her.200 Under section 6015(c), the taxpayer must establish that he or she is no
longer married to, is legally separated from, or was living apart for at least one
year from the spouse with whom he or she filed the joint return.20 1 Relief will be
granted so long as the deficiency remains unpaid as of the time of the election202
and so long as assets were not transferred between the taxpayer and his or her
spouse under a fraudulent scheme.20 3 In addition, relief under section 6015(c) is
available only to the extent that the taxpayer did not have actual knowledge of
the item giving rise to the deficiency,20 4 and to the extent that the liability
exceeds the value of disqualified assets.205
The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing the proper allocation of items
200 See I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
201 The Code provides:
Election.
(A) Individuals eligible to make election.
(i) In general. An individual shall only be eligible to elect the application of this
subsection if-
(I) at the time such election is filed, such individual is no longer married
to, or is legally separated from, the individual with whom such individual filed the joint
return to which the election relates; or
(I1) such individual was not a member of the same household as the
individual with whom such joint retum was filed at any time during the 12-month period
ending on the date such election is filed.
I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3) (West Supp. 1999).
202 See I.R.C. § 6015(c)(1). The interim guidelines provide the following exception:
An individual is eligible to be considered for relief in the form of a refund for
liabilities for. (a) amounts paid on or after July 22, 1998, and on or before April 15, 1999;
and (b) installment payments, made after July 22, 1998, pursuant to an installment
agreement entered into with the Service and with respect to which an individual is not in
default, that are made after the claim for relief is requested ....
I.R.S. Notice 98-61, 1998-51 I.R.B. 13, § 3.01(4).
203 The Code provides that: "If the Secretary demonstrates that assets were transferred
between individuals filing a joint return as part of a fraudulent scheme by such individuals, an
election under this subsection by either individual shall be invalid (and section 6013(d)(3) shall
apply to the joint retum)." I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1999).
204 See I.R.C. § 6015(c)(3)(C) (West Supp. 1999).
20 5 See I.LRC. § 6015(c)(4)(A) (West Supp. 1999). "Disqualified assets" are assets
transferred to the taxpayer by his or her spouse with the principal purpose of avoiding taxes or
the payment thereof. Id. at § 6015(c)(4)(B).
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that give rise to the deficiency. 206 The taxpayer must establish the allocation in
accordance with rules specified by the Commissioner,20 7 but the allocation will
generally be what it would have been had the taxpayer and his or her spouse filed
separately.208 If the IRS denies an election for separate liability, or fails to make
a ruling, the taxpayer may petition the Tax Court for review of the application
within ninety days after the earlier of the date on which a determination is mailed
by the IRS, or six months after the date on which the taxpayer filed the
election. 209
c. Rule 17: Equitable Relief
Section 6015(f) may provide equitable relief for taxpayers who fail to
qualify for relief under sections 6015(b) and (C),210 but for whom, "taking into
account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold... [him or her]
liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency" arising from a joint return. 211 For
example, relief would be denied under sections 6015(b) and (c), but might be
granted under section 6015(f), if the correct tax liability was in fact reported on
the joint return, but the taxpayer seeking relief did not know or have reason to
know that the deficiency remained unpaid, and that his or her spouse disposed of
the money for their own benefit.2 12 Rule IM, in effect, may provide a safety net
206 The Code provides that: "Except as provided in subparagraph (A)(ii) or (C) of
paragraph (3), each individual who elects the application of this subsection shall have the
burden of proof with respect to establishing the portion of any deficiency allocable to such
individual." I.R.C. § 6015(cX2) (West Supp. 1999).
207 The Code provides that: "The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out the provisions of this section, including-(1) regulations providing
methods for allocation of items other than the methods under subsection (d)(3) ... .' I.R.C.
§ 6015(g)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
208 The Code provides: "Except as provided in paragraphs (4) and (5), any item giving
rise to a deficiency on a joint return shall be allocated to individuals filing the return in the
same manner as it would have been allocated if the individuals had filed separate returns for the
taxable year." I.R.C. § 6015(d)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
Note, however, that if an item of deduction or credit was properly taken under a joint
return and is disallowed only because the returns are recomputed separately, the item will
nonetheless be allowed, and will be appropriately allocated between the taxpayer and his or her
spouse. See idJ at § 6015(d)(4).
20 9 See I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1999).
2 10 See I.R.C. § 6015(f)(2) (West Supp. 1999).
211 I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
2 12 See Interim Guidance for Equitable Relieffrom Joint and Several Liability, I.R.S.
Notice 98-61, 1998-51 I.R.B. 13, § 2.05, available in 1998 WL 858240 (acknowledging the
legislature's intent to provide for such relief).
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for those taxpayers who do not otherwise qualify for relief even under the
relaxed standards of the new innocent spouse provision.
Interim guidance has been issued by the IRS, effective December 7, 1998,
for those taxpayers seeking equitable relief under section 6015(f).213 These
guidelines are to be relied on until procedures are prescribed by the Chief
Counsel and until permanent guidelines are issued.2 14 According to the interim
guidelines, taxpayers seeking section 6015(f) relief must first establish that they
filed a joint return for the year in question215 and that relief under sections
6015(b) and (c) is unavailable.2 16 In addition: (1) the liability must be one which
remains unpaid at the time of the application for relief; (2) relief is not available
if assets were transferred as part of a fraudulent scheme between the taxpayer
and the spouse with whom he or she filed jointly; and (3) relief from liability is
available only to the extent that such liability exceeds the value of disqualified
assets.21
7
In particular, the taxpayer seeking relief under section 6015(0 for an unpaid
tax liability that was correctly reported on a joint return will need to establish
each of the following: (1) the liability had not been paid as of the date the return
was filed; (2) the taxpayer seeking relief is no longer married to, is legally
separated from, or has been living apart for at least one year from the spouse
with whom he or she filed the joint return; (3) the taxpayer filed the joint return
not knowing or having reason to know that the tax would not be paid, and it was
reasonable for the taxpayer to believe that his or her spouse would in fact pay the
full amount owed; and (4) the taxpayer would suffer undue hardship if he or she
were denied relief2 1 8
2 13 See generally id.
2 14 See I.R.C. § 5 (1994).
215 See I.R.S. Notice 98-61, at § 3.01(1).
216 See id. at § 3.01(2).
2 17 See id at § 3.01(4)-(6). "Disqualified assets" are defined in I.R.C. § 6015(c)(4)(B) as
assets that the non requesting spouse transferred to the taxpayer in an effort to avoid taxes. See
id. at § 3.01(6).
218 See id. at § 3.02. According to id. at § 3.02(4), "undue hardship" is as defined under
§ 1.6161-1(b) of the Income Tax Regulations, which provides:
The term "undue hardship" means more than an inconvenience to the taxpayer. It
must appear that substantial financial loss, for example, loss due to the sale of property at
a sacrifice price, will result to the taxpayer for making payment on the due date of the
amount with respect to which the extension is desired. If a market exists, the sale of
property at the current market price is not ordinarily considered as resulting in an undue
hardship.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6161-1(b) (1999).
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If the taxpayer qualifies for relief under section 6015(f) but for the fact that
he or she knew or should have known of any portion of the tax owed, he or she
will be denied relief only to the extent of that amount.2 19 Thus, the taxpayer will
be exonerated of any unpaid portions of which he or she did not know or have
reason to know. In addition, relief under section 6015(f) is limited to the liability
reported on the tax return prior to any subsequent adjustments that may result in
an understatement of tax, and is available to the taxpayer only to the extent that
the unpaid amount is attributable to his or her spouse.220
For individuals who meet the threshold requirements under section 6015(f)
but who fail to meet the requirements relating specifically to an unpaid amount
that was correctly reported on a joint return, the interim guidelines promulgated
by the IRS provide a partial list of factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether equitable relief under section 6015(f) should still be
granted.221 Relief may be granted if, under the facts and circumstances of the
case, it would be inequitable to hold the taxpayer liable for the unpaid amount.222
Relief is more likely if: the taxpayer is separated, living apart; or divorced from
his or her spouse; the taxpayer would suffer hardship if he or she were held
liable; the taxpayer suffered abuse from his or her spouse; or under a divorce
decree or settlement agreement, the taxpayer's spouse is legally obligated to pay
the tax liability or deficiency.223 Relief is less likely if: the deficiency arises out
of an item or liability that is attributable to the taxpayer; the taxpayer knew or
had reason to know of the unpaid liability or deficiency; the taxpayer
significantly benefited from the liability or items that give rise to the deficiency;
or under a divorce decree or settlement agreement, the taxpayer is legally
obligated to pay the liability. 224
3. Equitable Relieffor Innocent Spouses Filing Separate Returns in
Community Property States
In addition to providing equitable relief under section 6015(f) for taxpayers
who filed jointly, the 1998 Act amends section 66(), 2 25 authorizing the IlS to
2 19 See I.R.S. Notice 98-61, at § 3.02(3).
220 See id. at § 3.02(4).
221 See id. at § 3.03.
222 See id.
223 See id. at § 3.03(1).
224 See id. at § 3.01(2).
225 See Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 3201(b), 112 Stat. 685,739 (1998) (amending I.R.C. § 66(c) (1994)). Section 66(c) originally
provided:
1999] 2085
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
grant equitable relief to married individuals who filed separate returns in
community property states.226 The IRS is authorized to grant relief for liabilities
arising after July 22, 1998, as well as those that remain unpaid as of that date.227
The same factors weighing for and against equitable relief under section 6015(f)
are applicable under section 66(c). 228
C. The Innocent Spouse Provision: What Are the Implications?
Prior to the recently-enacted changes, relief was far too limited under the
innocent spouse provision because the rules were too complex and the courts'
interpretations too inconsistent. However, even under the newly-expanded rules,
the innocent spouse provision fails to provide women with adequate relief from
the injustices ofjoint and several liability. And where the provision does provide
some measure of relief, there is too high a price to pay: The provision will affect
not only how society views women but how women view themselves, and thus
the Tax Code's victimization of women will continue.
Spouse relieved of liability in certain other cases. Under regulations prescribed by the
Secretary, if-
(1) an individual does not file ajoint return for any taxable year,
(2) such individual does not include in gross income for such taxable year an item of
community income properly includible therein which, in accordance with the rules
contained in section 879(a), would be treated as the income of the other spouse,
(3) the individual establishes that he or she did not know of, and had no reason to
know of, such item of community income, and
(4) taking into account all facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to include such
item of community income in such individual's gross income,
then, for purposes of this title, such item of community income shall be included in the
gross income of the other spouse (and not in the gross income of the individual).
Id.
The 1998 Act amended § 66 by adding the following language to subsection (c):
Under procedures prescribed by the Secretary, if, taling into account all the facts and
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
deficiency (or any portion of either) attributable to any item for which relief is not
available under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
liability.
1998 Act, § 3201(b). The language added via this amendment is similar to that contained in
§ 6015's equitable relief provision. See I.R.C. § 6015(f) (West Supp. 1999).
2 26 Taxpayers who file jointly in community property states may elect relief under IR.C.
§ 6015. See supra note 95.
227 The language used is similar to that ofI.R.C. § 6015(f) (West Supp. 1999).
22 8 See I.R.S. Notice 98-61, at § 1.
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1. Who Will Benefit Under the Innocent Spouse Provision?
One concern about the newly-expanded rules is that they may benefit most
those women who can afford a good divorce lawyer and who are thus better
informed of their potential rights under the innocent spouse provision.2 29 These
women may be better able to negotiate the timing of a divorce or separation so as
to meet the deadline-within two years after the IRS commences collection
activities-for a separate liability election under Rule 11.230 Likewise, these
women may be better able to negotiate the terms of a divorce agreement so that
their spouses are legally obligated to pay the taxes owed-one consideration for
the courts when determining whether to award equitable relief under Rule I to a
taxpayer who does not otherwise qualify for relief under Rules I or II for an
unpaid tax deficiency that was correctly reported under a joint return. 231 While in
the past, relief was hard to come by for the educated working woman "because
courts time and again... interpreted 'innocent' to mean hopelessly stupid about
money,"232 it may be this same woman who is most successful at finding relief
under the new innocent spouse provisions--rather than those women who are in
most desperate need-because she has access to better resources.
2. The New Innocent Spouse Provision: Merely Furthering the
Victimization of Women?
Under the new innocent spouse provision, a woman who finds relief from
joint and several liability will do so only if she establishes that she is naive,
uneducated, abused, abandoned, that her marriage has failed, or that the
assessment will cause her undue hardship (i.e., that she is a victim). The message
to society-that women are helpless-is far too high a price for women to pay,
especially considering that the current tax scheme fails married women by
allowing them to become victims in the first place, providing them with every
disincentive to establishing financial independence while offering an incentive to
file jointly with their spouses and assume the risk of joint and several liability.
Yet another possible message to society, however unsupported the charge may
be, is that many women are now empowered to cheat the system-by signing a
joint return in order to save on their families' taxes while looking askance from
their husbands' business dealings and their reportings to the IRS, only to seek
refuge under the innocent spouse provision when necessary to escape liability for
229 See supra note 167.
230 See supra Part llI.B.2.b.
23 1 Seesupra Part II.B.2.c.
232 See Cunnins, supra note 25.
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an assessment of taxes owed.
More importantly, the innocent spouse provision will affect how women
view themselves and may further impact women's choices as to the role they
will play in society. In order to find reprieve from joint and several liability,
many women will need to establish that they are victims-and in doing so, they
will convince themselves that they are victims. The 'I am a victim" mentality can
be emotionally crippling for many women who discover too late that they are
financially dependent on their husbands because of the unfortunate choices they
made-choices shaped largely by our tax laws.
Broadening the relief available to women from joint and several liability is
not the appropriate response to a law that is itselfinequitable. The more logical
response is to repeal joint and several liability and to stop victimizing women in
the first place-by taxing them under a scheme that does not discourage them
from establishing financial independence and that does not penalize them for
choosing to work and marry. But if revamping the Code to eliminate the biases
against women is too great a step to take, then the least we can do is abolish joint
and several liability and replace it with a proportionate liability standard, holding
women accountable only for the taxes attributable to their own income.
IV. A NEw DAY AT THE IRS?233
Since the enactment of the innocent spouse provision, the IRS has received a
flood of applications for innocent spouse relief-at least one thousand per week
since February 1999.234 The applications are piling in on top of a backlog of
unresolved cases,235 approximately two thousand of which had been suspended
for review in 1998 until the interim guidelines were issued.236 While it remains
to be seen how well the IRS will manage the applications under the new
provisions, there are some indications that little has changed for the agency so
far, despite the fact that "[tihe nation's tax collector is getting a kinder, gentler
makeover.... "237 And, so, in addition to the indignity of having to establish that
they are victims, many women requesting innocent spouse relief may face an
uphill battle against the IRS even under the expanded rules.
233 The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Charles 0. Rossotti, has made assurances
"that it is a new day at the IRS." InternalRevenue Service, supra note 2, at *13.
234 See Karen Hube, More Aggressive Strategies Will Be Needed to Meet -filing Goals,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 1999, at Al.
235 See id.
236 See supra note 173.




In April, ABC News reported that IRS employees who had come forward to
testify before the U.S. Senate in September of 1997 did so on the condition of
anonymity.238 They testified behind screens and with their voices disguised, for
fear of retaliation should their identities be revealed to the IRS. 239 One IRS
employee, Jennifer Long of the Houston district office, however, did speak
openly about the abuses committed by her employer.240 But despite the fact that
she was promised protection by the U.S. Senate, her superiors almost
immediately sought retaliation.241 Her performance evaluations went from
excellent to poor, and other employees were afraid to associate with her.242
In fact, when the IRS's Houston District Office learned that Long had
spoken with ABC News, she received a sixty-eight-day notice that she must
improve her performance or risk dismissal.243 The notice was subsequently
withdrawn by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Charles 0. Rossotti, when
Senator William Roth called him to advise him of Long's situation and to warn
him that "[v]e cannot tolerate retaliation."244 In addition to withdrawing the
notice, Rossotti responded by removing the acting director of the Houston
district office and sending a team of top Washington officials to Houston to
investigate the District Office.245 Jennifer Long later commented, "I think Mr.
Rossotti really does want things to change. But the people, the management, they
don't want any part of that."246 Meanwhile, in a new set of hearings to be held in
September 1999, Senator Roth planned to investigate not only the IRS's
retaliation against Long but also another serious issue-why the IRS has not
been protecting taxpayers in accordance with congressional intent.247
In one recent case, a widow by the name of Nancy Johnson discovered that
she was left with a total tax debt of nearly $500,000 after her husband died of
cancer.248 She would have been able to pay off her entire renegotiated tax debt if
she could have refinanced her $222,000 home on which she owed only
238 See 20/20: The New IRS? (ABC television broadcast, Apr. 23, 1999), transcript
available in 1999 WL 6790668, at *1.
2 39 See id. at *2.
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246 Id. at *11.
247 See id.
248 See id. at *4.
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$41,000.249 But both the State of Utah and the IRS had placed liens on the home
because of the unpaid taxes, and only Utah agreed to the refinancing-the Utah
tax agent believed that Johnson qualified for innocent spouse relief.250 The IRS,
on the other hand, objected to the refinancing plan despite Johnson's application
for innocent spouse relief because it "would not protect the full interest of the
United States government. '251 As a result, Johnson's home was foreclosed-and
sold for $51,000.252 After the mortgage was paid off, Johnson was left with less
than $10,000 to pay the outstanding tax bill.253 The Utah tax agent commented,
"I was truly outraged. And I was outraged, because nobody won on this thing
other than the person who bought the home. '254 Her response to the question,
"And who lost?" was: "The Internal Revenue Service, the Utah State Tax
Commission and especially Nancy Johnson. ' 255 Johnson sold all of her
possessions in a yard sale.256
With the emphasis on reform and the recent expansion of the rules, one
wonders what problems lie ahead for innocent spouses who petition the
government for relief. One problem is that the rules are being applied by the very
same agency that targeted "innocent" wives in the first place-the IRS. But even
national taxpayer advocate Val Oveson has stated that "[t]axpayer rights are
first" and that "it will take time for IRS employees to fully embrace this
philosophy, particularly if it means a few dollars less in tax collections." 257 In the
meantime, cases are quickly piling up.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress meant well when it enacted the innocent spouse provision. The
expanded rules offer reprieve for women who are "innocent" under the law but
who would otherwise be jointly and severally liable for tax deficiencies
attributable to their husbands. But despite Congress' good intentions, the
innocent spouse provision is not the answer. It never has been. By broadening
relief under the innocent spouse provision, Congress has merely chosen the
249 See id.
250 See id.
251 Id. (citation omitted).
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lesser of two evils-requiring women to declare themselves victims under one
law in order to avoid being victimized under another. Congress has entrusted the
administration of innocent spouse cases to the same agency-the IRS--that
targeted innocent spouses in the first place, an agency that has yet to prove itself
under the new reforms. Ending the blatant discrimination against women under
the current tax laws calls for radical change, and at the least calls for one small
step toward dignity and equality for women-the repeal of joint and several
liability in favor of a proportionate liability standard.

